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Abstract

The 2001 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization recommended that U.S. efforts in national security
space be elevated to the highest national security priority. With more focused high-level
attention on national security space decisions, a measure that captures and quantifies the
value of space capabilities to combat operations professionals is desired. This thesis
models what the air warriors desire from space assets in combat.
A Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) approach was used to elicit values from air
combat experts with operational experience. An initial Gold Standard value model was
constructed and validated by air combat experts with recent experience in joint air
operations. The strategic objective, “Leverage National Security Space Capabilities to
Enhance Air Combat Operations,” was decomposed into values which were structured
into a hierarchy. Measures and value functions were identified for the bottom-tier values,
which were weighted locally to assess their relative importance.
The research identified measures of merit with thresholds beneath which value at
higher levels is eliminated, resulting in a multiplicative value function using indicator
variables. An additional result is the separation of communication and navigation
measures into pre-flight and in-flight components, which has not been documented in
previous literature.

xii

THE AIR WARRIOR’S VALUE OF NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE

I. Introduction

What Does National Security Space Bring to the Air War?

The U.S. Government employs a vast array of national and military space
capabilities (termed national security space in this thesis) that have served, and
continue to serve, as a force multiplier in military operations. National security space
gives the warfighter engaged in operations the leverage that comes from “global view”
(SPACECAST 2020, 1994: Introduction). This leverage, however, comes at a price.
The Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
Management and Organization (also known as the Space Commission Report)

cautioned that the U.S. is uniquely dependent on national security space, and that this
dependence results in vulnerabilities (Space Commission Report, 2001:9). Adding to
the price to be paid for space leverage for the warfighter is the monetary burden of
putting systems in space, with cost being a “fundamental limitation to nearly all space
missions” (Wertz and Larson, 1999:2).
The advantages, vulnerabilities, and high cost of space capabilities represent
multiple values that must be considered when making national security space decisions.
The focus of this thesis is to uncover and model the values that air combat professionals
hold with respect to national security space. The approach involves capturing both the
qualitative and quantitative contributions of space to the air war, as assessed by air
warriors with experience in executing air combat operations. Throughout the text of
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this thesis the term air warrior will be used to denote the air combat professional,
defined as the military service member who directly applies force with air assets.
The senior Air Force leadership has recently stated that three core competencies
remain at the heart of the Air Force’s mission. Two of these competencies, technologyto-warfighting and integrating operations, will be nurtured by the analysis done in this

thesis (Roche, 2003:1-2; Jumper, 2003:1-2).1 Integrating operations involves
translating the Air Force’s “air and space power vision into decisive operational
capability” (Jumper, 2003:2), which has been and continues to be crucial to “prevailing
in conflict and averting technological surprise” (Roche, 2003:2). The goal of
integrating operations is to “envision, experiment, and ultimately, execute the union of

a myriad of platforms and into a greater synergistic whole” in support of maximizing
the unique capabilities that air and space power bring to the fight (Roche, 2003:2),
resulting in the seamless integration of systems, activities, and expertise (Jumper,
2003:2). The goal of this thesis is to develop the air warrior’s yardstick for measuring
how well national security space capabilities satisfy these core competencies.
This integration of technology into warfighting requires decision makers to
balance multiple objectives. Value-Focused Thinking (VFT), as developed by Ralph
Keeney and refined by Craig Kirkwood and others, is a modeling technique that has
been frequently used to assist with both military and civilian decisions. In this thesis
VFT is used to identify and quantify what the users of national security space value in
an analytical, documented, and traceable manner. As will be shown in Chapter II, VFT
has been applied in a broad array of military applications, and this thesis is an effort to

1

The other competency is “Developing Airmen” (Roche, 2003:1; Jumper 2001:1), which falls outside
the scope of assessing the value of space from the air warrior’s point of view.
2

extend its advantages to maximize national security support to the air combat
professional. The resulting model not only represents the air warrior’s point of view for
his or her own benefit, but also provides useful insights to decision makers in the
Intelligence Community (IC), and analysts in the modeling and simulation
communities.

Setting the Decision Frame

Setting the decision frame is a prerequisite to building a value model. The
decision frame consists of the fundamental objectives, which are the focus of this study,
and the decision context, which is set beforehand by the scope of the activity being
contemplated (Keeney, 1992:35). There exist various decision contexts concerning the
set of space alternatives that provide value to the air warrior, from the comprehensive
case of all activities in space to any narrower set of space activities. The boundary of
the analysis of this thesis includes all Department of Defense (DOD) and Intelligence
Community space assets, termed national security space by the Space Commission
Report (2001:ix), but excludes civil and international programs beyond the span of

control of the DOD and IC. An additional boundary is set by the need to limit analysis
to unclassified concepts and systems, although classified analysis is a possibility for the
future.

The Remainder of the Thesis Document

Chapter II of this thesis describes VFT and its previous applications to national
security space decisions, as well as examining the roles that values play in other space

3

decision-making methods. Chapter III presents the methodology employed in the
study, and Chapter IV presents the resulting model. Chapter V summarizes the results
of the research, and Chapter VI presents recommendations for future work in this area.

4

II. Literature Review

A review of literature pertinent to valuing national security space is important
for several reasons. A general overview of Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) sets the
stage for explaining the methodology in the study. An examination of values in other
forms of decision making with implications for national security space highlights the
advantages of a values-first approach. Previous work in VFT – as it has been applied to
national security space decisions, both at the space architecture level and at the
architectural element level – is then summarized, along with its implications for the
topic this thesis addresses.

Literature Review — Methodology

Value-Focused Thinking
Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) has been used over a broad array of
applications to develop decision-making preference models that are both qualitative and
quantitative. Ralph Keeney, in his text entitled Value-Focused Thinking (1992),
explains the VFT process by contrasting it with the usual decision-making process,
which he terms Alternative-Focused Thinking (AFT). He describes AFT as first
defining the problem, then identifying alternatives, and finally specifying the values by
which the alternatives will be evaluated. He states that identifying alternatives before
evaluation considerations will “stifle creativity and innovation” (Keeney, 1992:48). In
essence, putting emphasis on alternatives can act as a restrictive influence on additional
alternative generation, without regard to their suitability to the decision situation. AFT
may also obscure values not initially apparent to the decision maker (Keeney, 1992:24).

5

AFT may be likened to the admonishment “don’t just stand there, do
something.” A focus on alternatives may lead to a quick and easy “solution” in the
short term, but with a price to be paid in terms of the “solution’s” consequences
(Keeney, 1992:6). Value-Focused Thinking (VFT), on the other hand, encourages
stakeholders to “sit down” and take measure of their values before rushing to “do
something” that may or may not be in accord with the true values that are relevant to
the decision.
VFT, in contrast to AFT, calls for identifying what is important to the decisionmaker before alternatives are considered. Paying attention to the decision maker’s
values first may broaden the scope of solutions beyond those that were specified by the
initially apparent alternatives (Keeney, 1992:27), and may uncover the decision
maker’s or decision making group’s hidden values (Keeney, 1992:24).
Keeney further maintains that a focus on values offers several other advantages
to decision making. Awareness of values may help a decision maker decide which
information will be relevant to the problem, thus avoiding the waste of collecting
extraneous information (Keeney, 1992:24-25). Discussion of values brings more
stakeholders into the decision process, as values are usually stated in terms that avoid
esoteric technical concepts (Keeney, 1992:25). Values identification can help multiple
stakeholders resolve conflicts by separating discussions about decision outcomes from
discussions about the relative desirability of those outcomes by clarifying the basis for
disagreements (Keeney, 1992:25-26). Explicating values can ensure consistency across
multiple decisions (Keeney, 1992:26) and thinking about values may assist us in
creating new decision opportunities that offer chances for improving performance on
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the decision maker’s own terms (Keeney, 1992:27). Finally, values and their relative
importance to the decision maker can be modeled in terms of an objective function that
quantifies the consequences of alternatives that may be considered (Keeney, 1992:26).
This is the primary advantage this thesis purports to lend the air warrior: a method of
quantitatively evaluating national security space decision alternatives according to the
values that the air warrior holds.
Kirkwood (1997:12-13) recommends structuring a decision maker’s values in a
hierarchy, with the decision maker’s overall strategic objective at the top, and the
fundamental objectives that directly support the strategic objective in the first tier. As
value hierarchies have become commonplace in decision analysis literature, this
literature review will pass directly to the elicitation methods. For the interested reader a
detailed description of value hierarchies can be found in Appendix A.
Eliciting Value Hierarchies
Kirkwood mentions two sources from which value hierarchies can be
developed: relevant literature and casual empiricism (Kirkwood, 1997:21-22). A
review of the literature relevant to the current problem being studied may lead to
information that is useful for developing a hierarchy, or may even uncover hierarchies
themselves that yield insight into the current problem.2 Value hierarchies can also be
elicited from the decision’s stakeholders themselves. Kirkwood terms this approach
casual empiricism (emphasis in original), and he recommends that it be done through

structured interviews to ensure buy-in from the stakeholders and to ensure that the
appropriate measures, value functions, and weights are included in the hierarchy

2

For a set of preliminary national security space value hierarchies derived from content analysis of
doctrine, see Appendix 2.
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(Kirkwood, 1997:21-22). The method of this study has utilized both sources of values,
as will be explained in Chapter III.
The Gold Standard approach is often used to extract values hierarchies from
relevant literature. As used in Burk and Parnell (1997: 66) and described by Parnell,
Conley, Jackson, Lehmkuhl, and Andrew (1998:1338), this approach entails identifying
an authoritative policy document that describes major objectives within the decision
context. An adequate Gold Standard document will directly supply one or more tiers of
the value hierarchy from the objectives described within. The remainder of the
hierarchy can be developed by individuals who have the expertise necessary to render
adequate judgments that concern the decision at hand.
When time available with subject matter experts is limited, analysis of an
authoritative Gold Standard document can provide a starting point for a value
hierarchy. Extracting objectives from a Gold Standard document (e.g., doctrine) may
be done directly as in SPACECAST 2020 (Burk and Parnell, 1997:66), or may be
accomplished through a systematic analysis if there is enough lead-time before the
casual empiricism process begins. Appendix B describes such an approach that was
accomplished in strategic preparation for this thesis in which implicit organizational
objectives for national security space were identified in addition to the explicit
capability-based objectives.
The Silver Standard approach (Parnell et al., 1998:1340) is often used where no
Gold Standard document exists. This approach entails structuring a hierarchy from the
bottom up by identifying the objectives at the lowest tier. For example, in Foundations
2025, the value model developed for the Air Force 2025 study, bottom-tier objectives
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were identified using verbs to describe basic tasks that became bottom-level objectives.
The verbs were then structured into sub-objectives, objectives, and fundamental
objectives by the use of affinity diagrams, with the overarching strategic objective
taken from the original charge given to the Air Force 2025 participants (“achieve air
and space dominance”) (Parnell et al., 1998:1340).
The Platinum Standard, as developed by Parnell, Bennett, Engelbrecht, and
Szafranski (2002:82-83) uses information from both Gold Standard documents and
structured interviews with senior decision makers and stakeholders whose schedules do
not allow the time required to meet and discuss all of the bottom-level objectives
needed to form the lowest tier of the hierarchy. In their study of NRO Operational
Support Office (OSO) resource allocation, Parnell et al. (2002) used information from
23 structured interviews from within the OSO and from other NRO organizations to list
the future activities that would provide the most value to the NRO and its customers.
They then used affinity diagrams to group the activities into functions, from which the
strategic objective3 and fundamental objectives4 for the hierarchy were identified, with
the help of the Gold Standard documents and the interviews. Weights were elicited
beginning with the lowest level and proceeding upward by means of a survey of 23
OSO personnel (Parnell et al., 2002:85).
The Decision Frame
Keeney (1992:30) points out that a decision is framed by the decision context
and the fundamental objectives. The values of concern in a given decision situation are
3

Parnell et al. (2002) use the term “fundamental objective” to describe what is termed “strategic
objective” in the remainder of this thesis. To retain consistency, the term “strategic objective” will be
used.
4
Parnell et al. (2002) use the term “objective” to mean what the term “fundamental objective” means in
the remainder of this thesis.
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made explicit by objectives (Keeney, 1992:55) which are categorized into fundamental
objectives and means objectives (Keeney, 1992:34-35). Fundamental objectives
“characterize the essential reasons for interest” in a given decision situation, while
means objectives are “means to the achievement of the fundamental objectives.”
Fundamental objectives can be identified by asking, “Why Is This Important?”
(Keeney, 1992:66) (also known as the WITI test). Applying the WITI test to an
objective will lead to one of two responses: either the objective is important because it
supports the achievement of another objective, or it is simply important in its own right
(Keeney, 1992:78). The first response indicates that the objective is a means objective
that supports another objective (which may or may not be a fundamental objective)
while the second response indicates that a fundamental objective has likely been found
(Keeney, 1992:66).
Comparing VFT With a Space Systems Engineering Approach
Wertz and Larson address values and objective structuring in their text entitled
Space Mission Analysis and Design (Wertz and Larson, 1999:12-13). Although they

limit their discussion of values to the space mission design framework, an examination
of where values enter into the process is instructive. Their process, which has “evolved
over the first 40 years of space exploration,” (Wertz and Larson, 1999:1) consists of the
steps listed in Table 1:

10

Table 1. The Space Mission Design and Analysis Process.
Define
Step 1.
Define broad objectives and constraints.
Objectives
Step 2.
Estimate quantitative mission needs and
constraints.
Characterize Step 3.
Define alternative mission concepts.
the Mission
Step 4.
Define alternative mission architectures.
Step 5.
Identify system drivers for each.
Step 6.
Characterize mission concepts and architectures.
Evaluate the Step 7.
Identify critical requirements.
Mission
Step 8.
Evaluate mission utility.
Step 9.
Define mission concept (baseline).
Define
Step 10. Define system requirements.
Requirements Step 11. Allocate system requirements to elements.
Wertz and Larson, 1999:2.

The decision maker in space mission analysis and design (SMAD) can be the
sponsor, designer, end user, and/or the developer (Wertz and Larson, 1999:7). The
SMAD process starts with the decision maker’s values by qualitatively identifying
primary and secondary objectives at Step 1. Instead of subdividing the main objective
into supporting objectives, however, in Step 2 they focus attention on defining
quantitative measures and thresholds that will meet the objectives. Both Steps 1 and 2
require implicit value judgments to be made in determining what the objectives are and
what numerical measures of performance are required to meet the objectives. Value
judgments are also made when deciding which objective is primary and which ones are
secondary.
Generation of alternatives begins early in the process at Steps 3 and 4. System
drivers, which are the parameters that have the most impact on system design and cost
(Wertz and Larson, 1999:4), are identified at Step 5. These parameters, the
independent variables that control overall system performance, cost, and design (Wertz
and Larson, 1999:4) are akin to the attributes in a value hierarchy, as they are the inputs
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into the functions that will be used for evaluation. In Step 5, then, the focus shifts back
to values, as identifying the parameters that have the most impact on system design and
performance requires value judgment (emphasis added). Step 6 embraces both
alternatives and values by defining “in detail what the system is” (which corresponds to
alternatives) and “does” (which corresponds to values) (Wertz and Larson, 1999:4).
Values are the focus at Step 7, with judgments made as to which requirements are
critical and which ones are not. Evaluation of alternatives occurs at Step 8, with
evaluation of the goodness of the critical performance measures left to the system user
or developer (Wertz and Larson, 1999:5). Step 9 is the selection of one or more
alternative baseline system designs, and becomes the starting point for the iterative
trade process (Wertz and Larson, 1999:5). This returns the focus to alternatives. Step
10 again requires implicit value judgments, as it “translates the broad objectives and
constraints of the mission into well-defined system requirements” (Wertz and Larson,
1999:5). Values are key at Step 11, the allocation of requirements to the specific
elements of the space mission (Wertz and Larson, 1999:5). A key feature in the entire
11-step process is successive iteration through all 11 steps until the requirements are
met (Wertz and Larson, 1999:2). This allows both values and alternatives to be
adjusted according to the decision maker’s preferences. The oscillating focus between
values and alternatives, as assessed by this author, is shown in Table 2.
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Table 2. Focus of Attention at Each Step of the Space Mission Design and
Analysis Process.
Focus of
Attention

Define Objectives

Step 1.

Values

Step 7.

Define broad objectives and
constraints.
Estimate quantitative mission needs
and constraints.
Define alternative mission
concepts.
Define alternative mission
architectures.
Identify system drivers for each.
Characterize mission concepts and
architectures
Identify critical requirements.

Step 8.

Evaluate mission utility.

Values

Step 9.

Define mission concept (baseline).

Alternatives

Step 10.

Define system requirements.

Values

Step 11.

Allocate system requirements to
elements.

Values

Step 2.
Characterize the
Mission

Step 3.
Step 4.
Step 5.
Step 6.

Evaluate the
Mission

Define
Requirements

Values
Alternatives
Alternatives
Values
Alternatives/
Values
Values

Modified from Wertz and Larson, 1999:2.

Keeney’s approach focuses on values in a different manner. First, the situation
should be assessed as a decision problem, which “usually occurs as a result of actions
that are not controlled by the decision maker” (Keeney, 1992:48) or a decision
opportunity, which is “identified and defined by the decision maker” (Keeney,
1992:50). Although space mission designs have been precipitated by external events in
the past (e.g., Sputnik, the Challenger accident), most current national security space
missions represent opportunities to improve on existing capabilities (e.g., GPS III
follows GPS II, SBIRS improves on DSP). Keeney’s framework would thus categorize
most space missions as decision opportunities (Keeney, 1992:50).
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The process for addressing decision opportunities depends on whether strategic
objectives have been specified or not. As the SMAD process calls for defining broad
objectives in Step 1, it is assumed that strategic objectives have not been specified. The
VFT sequence of activities for decision opportunities where strategic objectives have
not been specified are as follows (Keeney, 1992:49):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Identify a decision opportunity.
Specify values.
Create alternatives.
Evaluate alternatives.
Select an alternative.

Value judgments are apparent in the first two activities, implicitly in the first case and
explicitly in the second. From there values set the stage for generation and
consideration of alternatives.
Interestingly, Wertz and Larson discount the value of having one overarching
strategic objective that subsumes and links a set of fundamental objectives. The
following statement deems two of the objectives from their notional FireSat system
incompatible:
…we recommend strongly against numerical formulas that try to “score” how
well a mission meets its objectives. We can compute probabilities for achieving
some technical objectives, but trying to numerically combine the coverage
characteristics of different FireSat constellations with the political impact of
launching FireSat is too simplistic for effective decision making. Instead, we
must identify objectives separately so we can judge how to balance alternative
objectives and mission concepts (Wertz and Larson, 1999:13).
A value-focused analysis would address this apparent incompatibility by using proxy
attributes where directly measurable attributes are not apparent. These are measures
that indirectly assess the achievement of one objective by directly measuring the
achievement of an associated objective (Keeney, 1992:103; Kirkwood, 1997:24). In
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the FireSat example, the decision maker would be asked to examine his/her/their values
to determine how much coverage characteristics are worth in comparison to political
impact. Should political impact prove to be unquantifiable or immeasurable, an
attribute may be identified that captures the political impact of launching a satellite (for
example, this proxy attribute could be the number of diplomatic notes received from a
particular government that mention the launch in a positive or negative manner). These
values would then be weighted in the hierarchy according to the decision maker’s
preferences.
Keeney also addresses oscillation between AFT and VFT before strategic
objectives have been specified:
Before specifying strategic objectives, a decision maker may use alternativefocused thinking in one decision situation and use value focused thinking in
another decision situation. It is perhaps a bit schizophrenic, but one can jump
back and forth from one approach to another on different “problems” (quotes in
original). But after the decision maker does the deep thinking necessary to
identify and structure strategic objectives and spends the time to understand the
guiding significance of these objectives for decision making, the decision maker
should naturally use value-focused thinking in all decision situations. The
decision maker will now view the world “through value-focused glasses”
(quotes in original) (Keeney 1992:51).
Recall that SMAD requires iteration of the whole 11-step process (Wertz and Larson,
1999:2). In his framework Keeney does allow oscillation between alternatives and
values in order to specify strategic objectives (Steps 1 and 2 of SMAD), but once they
have been specified, he recommends that VFT be used to complete the process.
Keeney’s contribution to SMAD would be to have the decision maker firmly define
objectives at Steps 1 and 2, and relate them to each other in a hierarchical fashion. This
should shorten the time spent on values at later points in the 11-step process, especially
at Steps 7 and 8 where the meaning of “critical” will have been firmly established,
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quantified, and documented through value elicitation. With rigorous identification of
and definition of values at the outset, Steps 1 and 2 may be omitted in succeeding
iterations of the SMAD process.
Another point of contrast between SMAD and VFT is their respective treatment
of unstated objectives. Wertz and Larson (1999:12) acknowledge that “nearly all space
missions have a hidden agenda which consists of secondary, typically nontechnical
objectives” (italics in original) that are “equally important to satisfy” (Wertz and
Larson 1999:12). Although Wertz and Larson state that secondary and nontechnical
objectives must be identified (Wertz and Larson 1999:13), they prescribe no method for
uncovering them. In contrast, Keeney (1992:24) holds that the conscious values
uncovered by VFT “may also provide many keys to identify previously subconscious
values by “specifying attributes and quantifying values” (Keeney, 1992:158).
Comparing VFT With a Net Assessment Approach
Barry D. Watts applies net assessment in his diagnostic approach to valuing the
military use of space. Citing his conversation with Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon’s
Director of Net Assessment, he describes net assessment as “a discipline or art that
relies, above all else, on genuine understanding of the enterprise or business involved
rather than sophisticated models, complex systems, and abstract theory” (Watts,
2001:5). From his empirical (as opposed to prescriptive) perspective, he states “For the
United States, the military value of orbital systems rests almost exclusively in force
enhancement rather than force application” (Watts, 2001:12), citing several examples
from the Persian Gulf War to support his view.
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Watts admits more than once that his approach is not prescriptive, but
diagnostic (Watts, 2001:5,107), and herein lies the most striking difference between his
net assessment and VFT. Although Watts provides an evaluation of the U.S. military
use of space, his approach merely examines current alternatives that have been
implemented, and does not prescribe any approach to determine how the U.S. should
assess the military value of space. An approach to this problem applying VFT, in
contrast, would be prescriptive in nature (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976:vii), as it would
postpone consideration of alternatives until the values by which the assessment should
be made have been identified and modeled.
Literature Review — Applications to Decisions Affecting Space Architectures

To date there are few models used to assess the value of national security space
capabilities with representation of the warfighter’s perspective. Perhaps the bestknown space value model is SPACECAST 2020, a 1994 study directed by the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) to “identify and conceptually develop high-leverage
space technologies and systems that will best support the warfighter in the twenty-first
century” (SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis, 1994:1). This study used the
judgments of students and faculty from the Air Force Institute of Technology, the
School of Advanced Airpower Studies, the Air War College, and the Air Command and
Staff College to develop a value model to score space systems in pursuit of the CSAF’s
directive. While some of the participants were combat experts, not all of them had
been directly responsible for force application, and this may have had the effect of
mitigating the air warrior’s direct input into the value model. The scope of the model
thus included more than just the air warrior’s perspective. Additionally, the
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SPACECAST 2020 team was tasked with developing a value model only for ranking
and scoring technologies and systems. Excluded from the study were concepts that did
not concern non-technical considerations such as organization, policy, and education.
The execution of the model was limited to a series of white papers developed in the
course of the SPACECAST 2020 study, each presenting a space system and its
enabling technology with the promise of a high return on investment to the Air Force.
In 1995-96 the Air Force 2025 study was undertaken in an attempt to “generate
ideas and concepts on the capabilities the United States will require to dominate air and
space forces in the future” (AF 2025 Operational Analysis, 1996:Chapter 1). A value
model emerged from the 2025 study that was used to evaluate systems and technology
concepts that hold great promise for future Air Force application. As with its
predecessor SPACECAST 2020, the participants in the study were students and faculty
from the Air War College, the Air Command and Staff College, the Air Force Institute
of Technology, and civilian consultants. Although the air warrior’s perspective was
represented in this group, it was mixed with a broader set of perspectives intended to
give the fullest evaluation possible of air and space capabilities. As with SPACECAST
2020, AF 2025 was centered on technology and systems concepts, but it was not
intended to measure the value of other concepts. Another limiting factor for this
research effort is the breadth of the AF 2025 approach. The intent of AF 2025, as
stated above, was to evaluate all systems and concepts relevant to the Air Force, and
was not solely focused on the value of national security space capabilities. Although
valuable general insights emerged from AF 2025, it does not present a pure air warrior
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perspective, nor does it allow a focused assessment of the value of national security
space.
Daehnick (1999:103-181) elaborates on one of the main dichotomies brought
forth in SPACECAST 2020 (1994:5): that of command orientation and demand
orientation. He notes that the terms have traditionally been used to describe
information flow in a system, but that they can be applied to every part of a space
architecture (Daehnick, 1999:163n2). He describes the current space architecture as
command-oriented: “centralized, driven by specific performance requirements and
employing a push approach to providing services” (Daehnick, 1999:104). Daehnick
contrasts this description with demand orientation, which “implies a more decentralized
organization, a user-pull approach to providing services, and a focus on
responsiveness” (Daehnick, 1999:104). To aid in making “value judgments about an
architecture and especially to compare alternatives,” he lists the following attributes
(values) that provide a means for qualitative description: performance, responsiveness,
flexibility, robustness, logistics requirements, reliability/availability, ease of operations,
environment impact, and cost (Daehnick, 1999:114-115). Although this is clearly an
attempt to incorporate VFT into space architecture decision making, formal decision
analysis concepts such as mutual exclusivity, collective exhaustiveness, and preferential
independence are not mentioned.
Daehnick’s characterizations reveal that a proper VFT approach that captures
the values of the user (in this thesis, the air warrior) is well-suited in making the
transition from a command to a demand orientation, as command-oriented architectures
are capital-intensive and lend themselves to incremental change, while the
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responsiveness and adaptive nature of demand-oriented architectures are more in tune
with what the user needs (Daehnick, 1999:104-105). Tables 3 and 4 display
Daehnick’s comparison of priorities (weights) that command- and demand-oriented
architectures reflect.
Table 3. Command-Oriented Architecture Priorities.
H = High
M = Medium
L = Low

Space Segment
Payload

Performance
Responsiveness
Flexibility
Robustness
Logistics
Requirements
Reliability
Ease of
Operations
Environmental
Impact
Cost
Daehnick, 1999:118.

Ground Segment
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H
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H
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L
H

H
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H
L
L
L

L

L

L

L
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L

L

L

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

L

L

L

M

M

M

M

L

L

L

L

L

L

L

L

L

M

L

L

L

M

L

L

M

L

L

M

Table 4. Demand-Oriented Architecture Priorities.
H = High
M = Medium
L = Low

Space Segment
Payload

Performance
Responsiveness
Flexibility
Robustness
Logistics
Requirements
Reliability
Ease of
Operations
Environmental
Impact
Cost
Daehnick, 1999:119.

Ground Segment

Launch Segment
C2

Constellation

Craft

TT&C

Facilities

User

Sites

Vehicle

M
M
L
M
L

H
H
H
H
M

M
M
H
M
M

M
M
H
M
L

M
H
M
L
L

H
H
M
H
H

H
H
H
H
L

H
H
H
H
H

M
H
H
H
H

M
H

H
M

M
H

M
H

M
M

H
H

H
M

L
M

M
H

L

L

L

L

L

L

L

M

M

H

M

H

M

M

M

H

H

H
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These priorities reflect relative, not absolute, priorities in design considerations.
For example, a low priority item is not necessarily unimportant, but its priority would
compare unfavorably with a high or medium priority item (Daehnick, 1999:118).
Consistent definitions of “high,” “medium,” and “low” would strengthen the
measurement of the priority each attribute receives in each orientation.
Daehnick identifies other factors that come into play in space architecture
decisions as determinants, and he groups them into three categories: requirements,
technology, and budget (Daehnick, 1999:122). These factors are largely out of the
decision maker’s control. He lists the groupings of determinants shown in Table 5 as
follows:

Table 5. Space Architecture Determinants.
Requirements

Technology

Budget

Global coverage

DOD ability to drive technology

Early access
Pop-up crises
Flexible, expandable
capabilities
Rapid throughout

Increased emphasis on dual use
Microprocessor revolution
Command, control, and
communications improvements
Miniaturization, structures,
material
Standardization and modularity,
flexible manufacturing

In decline, especially for
research, development, and
acquisition
Need to reduce life cycle costs
Can market forces be tapped?

Daehnick, 1999:131.

Daehnick then raises the question of representing mathematically the value
judgments implied in the orientation matrices Tables 3 and 4 and the by crossmultiplying either the command-oriented matrix or the demand-oriented matrix with a
matrix of the determinants (Daehnick 1999:130). He suggests, if both the determinants
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and the elements and attributes (values) could be represented mathematically, their
matrices could be cross-multiplied to produce a “complete description of an
architecture.”5 Like Wertz and Larson (1999:13), he is skeptical of measuring
qualitative value judgments. He instead recommends an approach that better
accommodates the subjectivity inherent in dealing with qualities that are difficult to
estimate, but that may lend itself to eventual quantification.
Daehnick’s approach involves building a table of the attributes (values), one
architectural element (e.g. the constellation) and its priority with respect to commandor demand-orientation, and the implications of each of the three determinants on the
element. This methodology would then extend to each element of the architecture.
Table 6 shows these implications for a demand-oriented architecture with respect to the
constellation element:

5

Although Daehnick’s suggestion to build quantitative measures to value judgments by using matrix
multiplication has intuitive merit, he misses one of the requirements for matrix multiplication to take
place: the number of columns in the first matrix must equal the number of rows in the second.
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Table 6. Constellation Implications, Demand-Oriented Architecture.
Priority
Implications — Constellation
Constellation Requirements
Technology
Budget
Because of the
Emphasis on
Distributed
Performance
H
systemic versus
satellite measures

Right product
available quickly to
all users
Adapt to changing
situation

Responsiveness

H

Flexibility

H

Robustness

H

Proliferate, degrade
gracefully

Logistics

M

Reliability

H

Ease of
Operations

M

Environment

L

Augment and
replenish
Backup/swing
capability vice
individual system
More
systems>need for
standardized
operations
Boost or deorbit

Cost

M

Trade off some
capability for
affordability

architecture, use
most recent
technology
Tailored
systems, rapid
build and launch
Standardization,
modularity,C3,
on-board
processing
Autonomy,
distribution, C3,
on-board
processing
Standardization,
modularity
Redundancy,
self-healing
constellations
Autonomy, C3,
processing,
expert systems

requirement for
incorporation
of multiple new
technologies,
need more
R,D,&A
money’ this is
somewhat
offset since
many of the
technologies
are being
pursued
commercially

Extra fuel, short- No money for
life orbits
nuclear
Technology investment
requirements heavy, but dual-use a
possibility

Daehnick, 1999:134.

As mentioned, this approach lacks quantitative measures to gauge how well a
specific alternative meets a particular value. While the implications are “derived from
observation” (Daehnick, 1999:130), they are not traceable as presented in this form, and
the method of observation is not specified. It is unclear whose values have been
elicited in Daehnick’s analysis, so it cannot be determined if the opinions of air
warriors have been represented.
The reasons Daehnick lists for the current command orientation of national
security space architecture include compartmentalization due to security, a dearth of
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well-documented requirements for expanded capabilities, bureaucratic turf wars,
perceptions of technology limitations, cost, national politics, and “an inability to
articulate requirements from the side of the war fighter” (Daehnick, 1999:121-122).
This thesis addresses his call for a more focused effort at demand orientation for
national security space architecture by soliciting the demands (values) from the air
warfare experts themselves.
VFT was also used in the source selection for the next generation of imagery
satellites for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Burk, Deschappelles, Doty,
Gayek, and Gurlitz (2002) applied VFT in the form of multiattribute value
decomposition which resulted in 6 values at the first level (assuredness/robustness,
design scalability, flexibility, quality, quantity, and timeliness) which were decomposed
into 24 values at the second level, which themselves were decomposed into 256
metrics6 (Burk et al., 2002: 49). The second-level attributes and the metrics were
unavailable in open sources.
Loftis (2002) extracted preliminary value hierarchies by applying content
analysis to national security space doctrine. Using a method similar to the Silver
Standard, three space doctrine documents were scanned to collect phrases that direct
action toward objectives. These phrases were then affinity-grouped in a manner similar
to that of the verbs in the Foundations 2025 study (Parnell, Conley, Jackson, Lehmkuhl,
and Andrew, 1998:1340-1344). Value hierarchies consisting of the strategic objective
and top two tiers were constructed for each doctrinal document from these groupings to

6

Burk et al. (2002) use different terminology, with “attributes” and “sub-attributes” meaning the highest
and second highest levels of the hierarchy, respectively, and “metrics” replacing attribute as previously
defined.
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provide a doctrinal basis for future value-focused national security space discussions.
An extended excerpt from Loftis (2002) can be found in Appendix B.
Literature Review — Applications of VFT in Space Architectural Element
Decisions

VFT also has practical applications in space decision making that concerns
individual elements of space architecture. Lehmkuhl, Lucia, and Feldman (2001)
applied VFT to assist the GPS Joint Program Office in selecting the waveform for the
next generation of GPS satellites. In addition to its significance as a practical
application of VFT to space decisions, an important result of this VFT model is its
result in a waveform decision that was not initially the first choice of the review team.
The NRO’s Advanced Systems and Technology Directorate (AS&T) was tasked
with providing technology innovations to revolutionize global reconnaissance (Parnell,
Gimeno, Westphal, Engelbrecht, and Szafranski, 2001:21-22). A future value model
for AS&T’s Technology Enterprise was requested to challenge its research and
development (R&D) managers and technologists with audacious objectives (emphasis
in original). The strategic objective was to “provide technology innovations to
revolutionize global reconnaissance,” and its supporting fundamental objectives were to
“provide information superiority to enable NRO customers to revolutionize future
capabilities,” to “reduce life cycle costs by an order of magnitude,” and to “rapidly
design and deploy innovative technology solutions” (Parnell et al., 2001:22). The value
model was then used to compare the value and cost of projects in progress (Parnell et
al., 2001:25-30). Of particular interest to this study are the attributes used for some of

the objectives under “visualize the operational space,” a sub-objective of “provide
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information superiority…,” since they include qualitative values such as “plan in realtime,” (Parnell et al., 2001:22) and “resolve political, economic, social, and military
conflicts with no loss of life or resources” (Parnell et al., 2001:23).
VFT was also applied in an effort to structure the resource allocation process of
the NRO’s Operational Support Office (OSO) (Parnell, Bennett, Engelbrecht, and
Szafranski, 2002). Whereas the previous OSO process was described as “ad hoc” or
“wing it” (Parnell et al., 2002:78), a value model was developed to score alternatives
under consideration. The Platinum Standard approach was used, with inputs coming
from leaders and functional experts from both within the OSO and from other NRO
organizations, and additional information supplied from OSO/NRO Gold Standard
documents (Parnell et al., 2002:82 ). The interviewees were asked to identify future
OSO activities which were then aggregated into functions using affinity diagrams, and
objectives were specified for each of these functions to form the qualitative value
model. Evaluation measures were developed for each objective by OSO management
and technical leaders (Parnell et al., 2002:84).
New Combat Demands, New Appreciation

Much has changed in the U.S. defense posture since SPACECAST 2020 and AF
2025 were published — a war on terrorism has commenced, new organizations for the
defense of the homeland have been and are being erected, and major shifts in national
space policy have taken place. As new warfighting experience is accumulating, new
requirements are developing, and new possibilities for space utilization are emerging, a
new model of the value of national security space from the perspective of the air
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warrior at the point of force application is warranted to capture perspectives not
previously obtained.
Having reviewed much of the professional literature that covers the interface of
values and national security space decisions, attention in this thesis now turns to the
research method used in this analysis of the air warrior’s value of national security
space.
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III. Research Method

This chapter outlines the approach taken in the study. An initial hierarchy was
constructed from doctrine, and was given an initial face-validation by an operational
expert, a graduate of the USAF Weapons School. The initial hierarchy was then
revised and presented to a panel of subject matter experts (SMEs) for their input over a
series of four facilitated discussions. For difficult topics additional expertise was
rendered through electronic discussions with a group of instructors from the USAF
Weapons School. The expertise found at the Weapons School is recognized as the
highest in the Air Force, with only seven percent of the USAF fighter pilot community
ever having attended (Hehs, 1995: paragraph 11). Weapons School instructors are
chosen from the best graduates after a tour of operational duty, representing an
additional cut above the rest.
After the values were identified, the SMEs then developed measures, singledimension value functions (SDVFs), and assigned local weights to the hierarchy, which
was then modeled in a spreadsheet.
The Initial Hierarchy

The overarching strategic objective by which the value of space support to air
combat is measured is Leverage Space Capabilities to Enhance Air Combat
Operations. This value is at the top of the value hierarchy developed in this study.

As mentioned, the Gold Standard is often used when time with subject matter
experts (SMEs) is limited. Following the precedent set in the SPACECAST 2020 study
(Burk and Parnell, 1997:66), doctrine provided the starting point for the initial
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hierarchy. An examination of joint doctrine revealed no document dedicated
exclusively to air operations. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1, Air Warfare, was
examined and found to provide “initial guidance for conducting air operations as part of
aerospace warfare” (AFDD 2-1, 2000:v) which is consistent with the aim of this thesis.
AFDD 2-1 touts Asymmetric Force Strategy as a “new American way of war” that
requires “sophisticated military capabilities to achieve national objectives and avoid
costly force-on-force engagements” (AFDD 2-1, 2000:3), and the five components of
Asymmetric Force Strategy were considered for the first tier of values.
The First Tier Defined

The first tier of values is taken from the following five components of
Asymmetric Force Strategy (AFDD 2-1, 2000:3-5): the Commander’s
Conceptualization of the Battlespace, Controlling the Battlespace, Decisive
Maneuver, Precision Employment, and Integrated Sustainment. The consideration

of each as a candidate for a fundamental objective in support of the strategic objective,
Leverage Space Capabilities to Enhance Air Warfare Operations and the rationale

for acceptance or rejection is explained below:
The Commander’s Conceptualization of the Battlespace “includes collecting

and exploiting the information necessary to identify threats and opportunities regarding
national interests” (AFDD 2-1, 2000:3). National security space provides considerable
leverage in support of these objectives, and thus was included as a candidate for a
fundamental objective. As this thesis is focused on the perspective from the cockpit,
the qualifier Commander’s will be omitted. This value is summarized in the hierarchy
as “Understand.”
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Controlling the Battlespace as defined in AFDD 2-1 (2000:4) is the freedom

of operation necessary to enable friendly forces to “employ, maneuver, and engage
forces while denying the same capability to the adversary,” and thus qualifies it as a
means objective that supports the objectives of Decisive Maneuver and Precision
Employment. By virtue of using the same verbiage as these two other components,
Controlling the Battlespace, while still a key concept, violates the independence

requirement for a value hierarchy (Kirkwood, 1997:17-18) and was therefore
eliminated as a direct candidate for a fundamental objective.
Decisive Maneuver involves “positioning forces to gain favorable advantages”

(AFDD 2-1, 2000:4). National security space contributes to this objective by
augmenting aircraft’s navigational capabilities, and is included for consideration as a
fundamental objective. This value is summarized in the hierarchy as “Move.”
National security space contributes to Precision Employment by supplying
information to make force application “truly precise” (AFDD 2-1, 2000:5). Airpower
assets are needed to “engage the adversary on land, at sea, or in the air,” and space
capabilities, by virtue of their global view of these media (SPACECAST 2020, 1994:
Introduction), can enhance Precision Employment. It is thus included as a candidate
for a fundamental objective. This value is summarized in the hierarchy as “Fight.”
Integrated Sustainment supports deploying and maintaining forces, and

includes logistics, readiness, facilities, and modernization (AFDD 2-1, 2000:5).
Although Integrated Sustainment is crucial to winning the air war, for the purpose of
this study it was determined that these qualities fall outside of the context of national
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security space decisions from the air warrior’s cockpit view. Integrated Sustainment
was thus eliminated as a candidate for a fundamental objective for this study.
The strategic objective and the initial hierarchy developed from AFDD 2-1 are
shown in Figure 1:
Leverage National Security
Space to Enhance Air
Combat Operations

“Understand”
Conceptualization of the
Battlespace
Communication

Fidelity

“Fight”
Precision Employment

Vision

Airspace

Information
Denial

Precision

Coverage

Timeliness

“Move”
Decisive Maneuver

Identification

Position

Timing

Timeliness

Electromagnetic
Space

Surface

Figure 1. The Initial Hierarchy.

First Tier Value Decomposition — “Understand”

Value definition now proceeds down each first-tier branch. The “Understand” value is
shown in Figure 2:
“Understand”
Vision
Coverage

Airspace
Coverage

Surface
Coverage

Communication
Identification

Fidelity

Timeliness

EM Space
Coverage

Figure 2. The “Understand” Value and Its Branches.
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Supporting the Conceptualization of the Battlespace are the values Vision and
Communication. These descend from two of the values that emerged from the

SPACECAST 2020 study (Foreword): “unparalleled perspective (Vision) and very
rapid access to the earth’s surface (Communication).”
Understand — Vision
According to AFDD 2-1 (2000:3), “collecting and exploiting the information
necessary to identify threats and opportunities” is essential to conceptualizing the
battlespace. The concepts of collecting/exploiting information and identifying
threats/opportunities, translate into Coverage and Identification from space-based
systems. As space offers unparalleled perspective (SPACECAST 2020: Foreword), it
follows that that all aspects of earth coverage of events that concern the air warrior
must be considered: Airspace Coverage, Surface Coverage, and coverage of the
electromagnetic spectrum (EM Space Coverage). As information is collected using
space-based capabilities, its exploitation value is dependent on how well the event can
be identified, thus marking Identification as a value that falls under Vision.
Understand — Communication
Conceptualizing the battlespace is enhanced by the availability of information
from elements outside the cockpit. JP 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare,
describes the importance of Communication to conceptualizing the battlespace:
The ability to exchange near real-time data (such as targeting information)
enhances situational awareness and combat coordination between various
force elements including EW (electronic warfare) strike and/or execution assets,
command-control units, ES (electronic warfare support) collection units,
supported units, and others, is a critical combat requirement. (JP 3-51, 2000:III6, boldface in original, italics added for emphasis)
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The emphasis on near real-time data implies that Timeliness is a value that specifies
the importance of communication. JP 3-51 also specifies that the exchange of data
between force elements must be routine (JP 3-51, 2000: III-6). For a routine exchange
of data to take place clarity should be the norm; constant querying of transmitted
messages would indicate the exchange has not become routine practice. Thus, Fidelity
is proposed as a value that supports Communication.
First Tier Value Decomposition — “Move”

Continuing with the breakdown of the first-tier values, Decisive Maneuver,
summarized as “Move,” is the second first-tier value that national security space
capabilities can enhance. The expanded “Move” value is shown in Figure 3, and is
specified below:
“Move”

Positioning

Timing

Timeliness

Figure 3. The “Move” Value and Its Branches.

According to AFDD 2-1, Decisive Maneuver is “positioning forces to gain
favorable advantages over an adversary or event in anticipation of engagement or
strike”, with an emphasis on transitioning to Precision Employment (AFDD 2-1,
2000:4). Positioning is thus a value that supports Decisive Maneuver. Maneuvers
must also be executed at the right time and in the right sequence in accordance with the
Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP). According to AFDD 2-1, “the characteristics of
targets may also dictate the assignment of timing requirements to their order of attack
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in the MAAP.” This implies that the “Move” objective requires a sense of Timing in
addition to Positioning. Finally, as the pace of air combat can be crucial to the
outcome, the speed at which Positioning and Timing can be acquired is added as a
value expressed as Timeliness. Together, Positioning, Timing, and Timeliness are
grouped as Navigation.
First Tier Value Decomposition — “Fight”
Precision Employment is the final first-tier value to define. The expanded
“Fight” value is shown in Figure 4, and its specification follows:

“Fight”

Precision

Information Denial

Figure 4. The “Fight” Value and Its Branches.

The “Fight” value is derived from Precision Employment, found in AFDD 2-1
(2000:5). Taken directly from the title, Precision describes a value space capabilities
may add to air combat operations. Putting policy considerations aside, national security
space may also aid in denying an adversary information which may threaten aircrews,
in support of the same objectives as the policy of securing the exclusive rights to
imagery over an area of conflict, as was the case over Afghanistan in the fall of 2001.
(Morning Edition, 2002). Space-based Information Denial thus constitutes a value
that may aid the air warrior.
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Value Elicitation

The initial hierarchy formed the basis for interactive value elicitation from a
panel of air combat experts with the requisite training and experience to offer expert
opinion on air combat operations. The qualifications of the members of the panel are
outlined in Table 7:
Table 7. Qualifications of the Air Combat Expert Panel.
Combat Role
Service
Experience
and Platform
F-14 Pilot
Navy
Recently returned from deployment in East Asia
F-14 Radar
Navy
Operation Southern Watch
Intercept Officer
EA-6B ECM*
Navy
Operation Southern Watch, Operation Joint
Officer
Forge, Operation Enduring Freedom
EA-6B ECM*
Navy
Operation Southern Watch, Operation Northern
Officer
Watch, Operation Enduring Freedom
F/A-18 Pilot
Navy
Operation Enduring Freedom, recently returned
from deployment in East Asia
F-15E Pilot
Air Force
Operation Noble Eagle
F-15C Pilot
Air Force
Operation Northern Watch, Operation Southern
Watch
B-52 Pilot
Air Force
Test pilot, previous combat alert duty in support
of Middle Eastern Theater air operations
CH-46 Pilot
Marine Corps Operation Allied Force, Operation Enduring
Freedom
* Electronic Countermeasures

Of note is the joint nature of the group, with operational experience from three
branches of the U.S. armed services represented.

Specifying the Decision Context

When identifying the values the SMEs were told that two conditions were
necessary for a value to qualify. The first was that it had to represent something
important to their cockpit mission. The second was that it had to be a quality that
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national security space capabilities provide or enhance. They were also told to exclude
perceived budget and policy limitations and to focus their attention on what they value.

Determining the Measures and Single Dimensional Value Functions

Keeney and Raiffa note that “choosing a utility function subject to the given
constraints is somewhat of a heuristic process” (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976:198).7 In the
context of choosing a utility function that may be “almost appropriate” versus searching
for one that is “more appropriate” (quotes in original), they acknowledge that the
decision maker is faced with weighing the disadvantages of each. Due to operational
and resource restrictions, casual empiricism with the SMEs for this study was
accomplished over a spectrum of distances via facilitated meetings, one-on-one
interviews, and e-mail dialogue. To clarify such a complex and abstract subject as
values, measures, and value functions across a diffusely located group of experts, this
approach was the best fit.
In the facilitated discussions a set of candidate measures was reviewed, and the
SMEs were asked to choose the most appropriate, or to improve them as needed.
Upper and lower bounds were set, along with a direction of preference. The SMEs
were asked if any measures were constrained by thresholds, and what effect failure to
meet a threshold would have on the value under consideration.
With measures identified the focus turned to assessing the single dimension
value functions (SDVFs). The SMEs were presented with three generic examples of
SDVFs for the cases of both increasing and decreasing monotonicity: linear,
exponential, and S-curve (later modified to piecewise linear). They were then asked to
7

In 1976 the term “utility function” meant what we now refer to as “value functions.”
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assign value on a scale of 0 to 1 for levels of attainment of each measure according to
the type of value function. For linear measures only the endpoints were necessary to
plot, for exponential functions the endpoints plus the level that corresponds to a value
of 0.5 was assessed, and for piecewise linear functions the value at each transition from
one rate of value change to another was plotted.
In cases where the value assessed depended on the operational scenario (for
example, the degree of acceptable collateral damage), the SMEs were told to assume
that the most restrictive conditions applied (e.g., minimal collateral damage).
Weighting the Hierarchy

Per Stillwell, von Winterfelt, and John (1987:443), local weighting is
recommended for hierarchies constructed from the top down. This was the method
chosen for this hierarchy. To preserve consistent understanding of the definitions of
each value, the SMEs themselves were asked to weight each branch of the hierarchy.

Choosing an Overall Value Function

Utility independence conditions may be used to specify the final form of the
value function (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976:224). For this analysis mutual preferential
independence was assumed, implying that overall value function is additive linear. As
will be shown in Chapter IV, the additive linear function was modified by adding
indicator variables to account for measures for which failure to meet the threshold
eliminated all value.

37

IV. Results

Description of the Hierarchy

As mentioned in Chapter III, the strategic objective is Leverage Space
Capabilities to Enhance Air Combat Operations. After reviewing the initial

hierarchy presented in Chapter III, the SMEs developed it into a hierarchy that
represented their values. In this process they identified three first-tier values that
support the strategic objective: Communication, Navigation, and Denial. The SMEs
felt that the contributions of Communication and Navigation to the strategic objective
would sufficiently different with respect to the phase of the operation that they should
be weighted differently. Each is therefore divided into Pre-Flight and In-Flight
components to allow for different weighting with respect to the combat planning and
execution phases of air operations.
The full hierarchy is shown below in Figure 5.
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A description of each branch follows, and the measures with their SDVFs can
be found in Appendix C.
Communication
The complete decomposition of Communication is shown in Figure 6. The
numbers in parentheses represent the local weights assigned by the SMEs.

Communication
(0.4)

Pre-Flight
(0.25)

In-Flight
(0.75)
Voice
(0.5)

Voice
(0.25)
Span
(0.5)

Span
(0.5)

Reliability*
(0.5)

Reliability*
(0.5)

Data
(0.5)

Data
(0.75)

Span
(0.5)

Span
(0.5)
Reliability*
(0.5)

Reliability*
(0.5)

*Indicates value preservation threshold beneath which value for all of parent value is eliminated.
Figure 6. The Communication Value and Its Branches.

As mentioned, Communication was divided into Pre-Flight and In-Flight
components. These were each divided into Voice and Data components, which were
themselves divided into Span and Reliability. At this point the SMEs agreed that
Span and Reliability could be broken down no further.
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Early in the elicitation process the SMEs recognized that particular thresholds of
Communication must be met in order for a system to have value at higher levels. To

incorporate this characteristic measures were identified that have value preservation
thresholds, which only allow nonzero value when the threshold has been exceeded.
Precedent for this can be found in Kerchner, Deckro, and Kloeber (2001:51-52), in
which thresholds of attainment were identified for certain measures of Psychological
Operations (PSYOPS) products. For a PSYOP product to contribute any value toward
an objective, it the PSYOPS value model required to meet a threshold value for certain
measures. In a similar fashion the measures shown in Table 8 that support the
Communication value were deemed to have thresholds.
Table 8. Value Preservation Thresholds for Communication Values.
Value
Measure
Threshold
ThresholdDependent Value
Communication — Pre-Flight —
Voice — Reliability
Communication — Pre-Flight —
Data — Reliability
Communication — In-Flight —
Voice — Reliability
Communication — In-Flight —
Data — Reliability

Uptime During Preflight Planning
Uptime During Preflight Planning
Uptime During
Operation
Uptime During
Operation

75%
75%
90%
90%

Communication — PreFlight — Voice — Span
Communication — PreFlight — Data — Span
Communication — InFlight — Voice — Span
Communication — InFlight — Data — Span

In reviewing the thresholds elicited, it can be seen that the air warrior requires a
high degree of reliability for in-flight voice and data communication. If it is to be
valued in the fight, it must be held to be dependable.
Navigation
After dividing Navigation into Pre-flight and In-flight components, the SMEs
changed very little from the “Move” value in the initial hierarchy. As one indicator of
the difference in Navigation value with respect to operational phase, the SMEs
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considered Timeliness to be worthy of inclusion only in the In-flight portion of
Navigation. The remainder of Navigation is symmetric, consisting of Positioning,
Timing, and Reliability, which then had measures attached.

The complete decomposition of Navigation is shown in Figure 7.

Navigation
(0.3)

Pre-Flight

In-Flight

(0.25)

(0.75)

Position (0.2)

Position (0.25)

Timing (0.4)

Timing (0.25)

Reliability (0.4)

Timeliness (0.25)
Reliability (0.25)

Figure 7. The Navigation Value and Its Branches.

Denial.
The SMEs defined Denial as the ability of a space-based system to protect
aircrews from threats. The full decomposition of Denial is shown in Figure 8.
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Denial (0.30)

Information
Denial (0.6)

Threat
Removal (0.4)

Adversary
Communication (0.6)
Pre-Flight (0.2)
Voice (0.5)

Span (0.5)
Reliability (0.5)
Data (0.5)

Span (0.5)

In-Flight (0.8)

Reliability (0.5)
Voice (0.5)

Span (0.5)
Reliability (0.5)
Data (0.5)

Adversary
Navigation (0.4)

Span (0.5)

Reliability (0.5)

Pre-Flight
Reliability (0.2)

In-Flight
Reliability (0.8)

Figure 8. The Denial Value and Its Branches.

The SMEs felt that, should a space-based capability to protect aircrews be
developed, it would be important for that capability to deny an adversary information
and to destroy threats that the adversary may pose. Information Denial was specified
to have two components, Adversary Communication and Adversary Navigation.
These values were broken down in the same manner as the Communication and
Navigation values in the first tier of the hierarchy, with the reasoning being that
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opponents in an armed conflict, both being human, will value Communication and
Navigation in the same way. The SMEs decided, however, that the thresholds

identified in Communication would not apply to Adversary Communication, and
that denying an adversary a reliable navigation capability in both phases was the only
value that should be included under Adversary Navigation
The other value under Denial is Threat Destruction. This value could not be
further decomposed by the SMEs, and its value was determined to be best expressed in
qualitative terms. The measuring scale was categorical in the direction of increasing
threat.
The Measures and Single-Dimensional Value Functions

The base-level measures identified by the SMEs are listed below in Table 9. All
but one of them (Threat Destruction) are repeated in the hierarchy due to the division
of values by mission phase and the assumed similarity of Communication and
Navigation appreciation on the part of both friendly and adversary forces. Complete

descriptions of each measure and its associated SDVF can be found in Appendix C.
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Table 9. Measures at the Base Level of the Hierarchy.
Base-Level Value Measure
Comments
Span
Bandwidth
Bandwidth was identified as a proxy for
Increase
the volume of information. Although an
argument could be made for naming the
value Capacity, the SMEs retained the
term Span. The SMEs felt that the value
of increased bandwidth could best be
expressed as a factor of improvement over
current capability.
Area of Coverage Fixing a numerical value on the area of
coverage proved problematic, so a
categorical measure was identified to
represent increments of value to the air
warrior.
Reliability
Uptime
The % of time the capability is available.
Positioning
Horizontal Error
Error (in ft). The SMEs thought that ft is
more commonly used than meters by
aircrews.
Altitude Error
See Horizontal Error comments.
Timing
Timing Error
Difference from true time in sec.
Timeliness
Update Time
Time between request and receipt for a
navigational update .
Threat Destruction Level of Threat
No direct measure for threat level posed
by an adversary could be readily
identified, so value was assessed according
to categories.

It was decided that some values could not be measured on a continuous scale,
and could be better expressed categorically. For these measures the value for each
category was directly assigned. For the Threat Destruction value consensus between
the points of view of the B-52 pilot and the fighter pilots was reached in the following
manner. All were asked to rank and number the four threat categories (anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA), tactical surface-to-air missile (SAM), strategic SAM, and airborne
aircraft) in increasing order (1 to 4). The ranks for each threat category were then
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summed and normalized to find their relative value. The results are presented below in
Table 10:

Table 10. Assessed Values of Threat Destruction.
AAA Tactical Strategic
Airborne
SAM
SAM
Aircraft
Bomber
1
3
2
4
Fighter
1
2
4
3
Total
2
5
6
7
Normalized Value =
(Fighter + Bomber)/8
2/8
5/8
6/8
7/8

Weights

As mentioned, the hierarchy was weighted locally. The SMEs were asked to
examine each value, beginning with the first tier, and determine the relative weights of
each with the constraint that they all sum to one.
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V. Conclusions

The SPACECAST 2020 study was completed in 1994, nine years prior to this
one. Values, objectives, and the technical means to achieve them change over time,
and the SMEs were asked to recommend a revisit time for this study. In their judgment
five years is an adequate revisit time to determine if changes in objectives and means
have caused changes in the air warrior’s value structure for space capabilities.
Insights Revealed

This analysis reveals several insights into space support for air operations that
have not been documented in previous studies of the value of national security space.
The conclusions that can be drawn from this research include
1. The value of space support varies according to the mission phase.
2. The air warrior’s demand for data in the cockpit is expected to grow as more
is supplied.
3. Thresholds exist for reliability measures that eliminate the entire
contribution of the parent value to the overarching strategic objective.
More discussion of these conclusions follows.
Mission Phase Matters
The value the air warrior places on the space-enabled capabilities delivered
varies with phase of operation. Weights for both Communication and Navigation
were 0.25 for the pre-flight phase in which mission planning is the focus, but soared to
0.75 for the in-flight portion in which rapid decision-making and intense multi-tasking
occupy much of the air warrior’s time. This insight has operational implications for
synchronizing Space Tasking Orders (STOs) with Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) for a
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given theater or theaters (AFDD 2-2, 2001:37-39). Space support to the air warrior
should be optimized for the time periods when more aircraft are in the in-flight phase,
as specified by the ATO for a given operation.8
Data vs. Voice
A picture is worth a thousand words, or, in the air warrior’s parlance: a headsup display image is worth a thousand voice transmissions. The air warrior forecasts a
burgeoning need for data, as proxied by the measure of bandwidth. Although there is
some uncertainty specifying the upper end of the scale for the air warrior’s value of
data volume, there is no contest in the air warrior’s mind between data and voice
communication. A set of images gives the air warrior a far better concept of the
battlespace than does a set of voice transmissions. The only limitation on the air
warrior’s value of data mentioned in the discussions was human processing ability.
Value Preservation Thresholds
Another insight not found in previous VFT analyses of national security space is
that of reliability thresholds. The expected percentage of operational time, either inflight or pre-flight, that a communication system is available is an indicator of its
overall value for the specific function and phase desired (e.g., pre-flight data
communication). If the air warrior cannot expect a system to be available for at least
the threshold percentage, it contributes zero value not only to its reliability score but
also to its span score. Although SPACECAST 2020 included an availability score for
communication value, it was not linked to the other scores subsumed by

8

No de-emphasis of warriors not fighting in the air medium is intended here. As this analysis only
covers space support to the air warrior, inferences cannot be drawn on a broader scope than that of air
operations. Further analysis on space support to all warfighters is recommended to determine if phase is
a consideration for space support for them.
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communication. The air warrior’s value of communication as modeled in this thesis, on
the other hand, displays a dependency of span on reliability.
The Overall Value Function

To define the overall value function, let the overall weight of the ith measure,
wi, be defined as the product of each local weight and the weights immediately above it

in the hierarchy. Let Xi denote the ith measure, and vi(Xi) denote the SDVF for each
measure. To account for the value preservation thresholds in the communication
reliability measures, let the indicator variable I have a value of one when the threshold
is met, and zero otherwise. Let the set R contain each value in the model whose
contribution is eliminated by threshold non-attainment (communication Reliability and
Span). The overall value function is then
v( X ) = ∑ wivi ( Xi ) + ∑ Iiwivi ( Xi )
i∉R

(1)

i∈R

For this analysis a companion spreadsheet with measures, SDVFs, and overall
value function was developed. This spreadsheet accompanies all electronic copies of
this thesis.
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VI. Recommendations

Recommendations for the Present Study

Classified Value Elicitation
Although the SMEs deemed an unclassified value hierarchy to be sufficient, a
value elicitation environment free of classification constraints is desired. This would
presumably strengthen the focus on values by encouraging out-of-the-box thinking on
the part of the SMEs. The high classification of many national security space activities
considerably narrows the breadth of understanding in the warfighting community
(Toler and Tindell, 2003). Since no major declassification of national security space
looms on the horizon, a study in an environment that allows for classified discussion of
values and measures is recommended to augment this one.
Comparing Systems
Two different types of analysis of alternatives are recommended for this model:
analysis of different systems and analysis of different versions of the same system. The
value model may be used to compare different architectures to assess their contribution
to winning the air war in a given scenario, or to aid in source selection for a specific
capability. For example, when different contractors are being considered for a
communications system, the model can be used to assess the value each delivers to the
air warrior.
The value model may also be used to assess the improvement of one version of
a system over its predecessor, particularly if new capabilities are added. For example,
if a space-based navigation system should happen to have a communications package
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as a secondary payload, the model can evaluate the value of such a configuration to the
air warrior.
Sensitivity Analysis
As is usually done in multiple criteria decision analyses, sensitivity analysis is
recommended to determine if an alternative is sensitive to variation in weights.
Cost Analysis
The output of the model is a numerical result between 0 and 1. This value can
be divided by a system’s cost to derive a benefit/cost ratio for comparing alternatives,
following the precedent of Kerchner (2001:49-50). The cost need not be expressed
solely in dollars — a value hierarchy that expresses cost in other terms, such as
international political costs of space force application or research and development
opportunity cost due to diverted national technical resources may be built. It is
recommended that a cost hierarchy be elicited from the stewards of the public purse
(the Office of Management and Budget, for example), as they represent the key
decision makers on whose shoulders the cost of a space capability falls.
Test for Mutual Preferential Independence
Kirkwood (1997:239) specifies that Mutual Preferential Independence (MPI) is
necessary to justify the additive value function. Every effort was made to ensure this
concept in the development and elicitation stages of this model. The only exceptions,
of course, were the reliability thresholds that affect other values in the model.
Although the additive value function has been shown to be robust under moderately
non-ideal conditions (Stewart, 1996:301-309), further research should be accomplished
to ensure that MPI holds at least moderately well for this model.
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Elicit Values from All Warfighters
This analysis of the air warrior’s value of national security space should be
broadened to determine how other warfighters value space. This analysis is a first cut
at the larger problem of integrating space capabilities into the entire battlespace.
Recommendations for VFT Studies in General

Standardize Terminology
As Keeney notes in Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative
Decisionmaking, Alternative-Focused Thinking (AFT) is “the ‘natural’ way we have all

learned to deal with decisions” (Keeney, 1992:6). SMEs are valued for their expertise
within a given decision context, which has usually been accrued over time by
evaluating and selecting alternatives. They therefore enter into facilitation with an AFT
mindset. Communicating the idea of value requires them to think about what lies
behind alternatives that makes them valuable or not, and this can be a time-consuming
process that requires careful facilitation.
The multiple meanings of the word “value” itself compound this difficulty when
used in facilitation. In current VFT parlance “value” can take on different meanings:
1. A quantitative result from an evaluation (the value of space to air combat).
2. The evaluation considerations that are distilled by using the WITI test.
Military SMEs are already accustomed to thinking in terms of core “values.” Care
must be taken during facilitation discussions to establish common understanding of
value terminology.
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Elicit a Revisit Time from SMEs
Objectives change, alternatives change, lessons are learned. At the time of the
present writing, nine years have passed since SPACECAST 2020 was published. As
was noted in Chapter I, many changes in national security space organization, policy,
and technology have come about since then. To capture possible changes in values as a
result of changes in means and ends, the value hierarchy should be updated after a time
period specified by the SMEs. When asked when they would expect their values to
change sufficiently to revisit the analysis, the SMEs responded that five years would be
a good time to conduct this study again. To account for changing values, leadership
turnover, and improvements in means of reaching goals, a SME-specified revisit time
should be included as part of every VFT analysis.
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Appendix A. A Review of VFT Hierarchies.
Value-Focused Thinking

Ralph Keeney, in his text entitled Value-Focused Thinking, states “values are
what we care about… (and) should be the driving force for our decision-making”
(Keeney, 1992:1). Values are what matter to us, the “principles used for evaluation”
(Keeney, 1992:6) of alternatives, but, he contends, the usual approach to decision
making takes a different form that he terms “Alternative-Focused Thinking (AFT)”
(Keeney, 1992:4).
The AFT approach begins with identifying the problem, and then continues with
immediate consideration of available alternatives. After identifying the alternatives the
next step is to select the best from among them.9

The visibility of, and familiarity

with, available alternatives tends to influence the values which the decision maker
thinks are important, thus masking many of the values that are germane to the decision.
In this approach, values are made explicit by alternatives. Consideration of alternatives
often involves listing their advantages and disadvantages, which in turn determine the
values by which the decision maker will judge the alternatives. Sifting through
alternatives and then identifying the principles used for their evaluation holds a great
deal of intuitive appeal, as alternatives represent the “what to do” part of the decision.
Keeney considers it to be “the easy way out of a decision problem,” however, with “a
price to be paid later when the consequences accrue” (Keeney, 1992:6). The danger in

9

In addition to Keeney (1992:4), Charles Lindblom in “The Science of Muddling Through” (Lindblom,
1959) asserts that decision-making often begins with alternatives, but uses it to advance a quite different
view. Essentially, he holds that most problems are too complex for an exhaustive consideration of all
available alternatives and their consequences, and that merely tweaking previously known alternatives
offers a sufficient problem-solving paradigm.
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this approach is twofold: first, what is important to the decision maker may be outside
the span of values originally encompassed by the alternatives considered, and second,
much time may be wasted sifting through alternatives before a method of measurement
has been identified.
In contrast, Keeney offers Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) as a higher leverage
approach to decision making than AFT. Central to the VFT approach is the recognition
that decisions need not be considered problems, but opportunities to create alternatives
(Keeney, 1992:8) by beginning with what matters: values (Keeney, 1992:8-9). He
states that “values of decision makers are made explicit with objectives,” (Keeney,
1992:33) and goes on to explain that the decision maker’s true values that drive the
decision should be identified before examining alternatives (Keeney, 1992:22).
Listing objectives in order to explicate values is a good start toward identifying
values; organizing them according to purpose helps structure the decision making
process. To link objectives with values, Keeney separates objectives into two types:
fundamental and means (Keeney, 1992:34). Fundamental objectives are those that
describe why the decision is important to the decision maker; means objectives
prescribe a means of attaining a higher objective.
To link means objectives to the fundamental objectives they support, Keeney
applies the “Why is this important?” (WITI) test for means objectives, which asks the
decision maker why he/she thinks a particular means objective is worth pursuing. This
may lead to another means objective, which will also be subject to the WITI test. The
WITI test is repeatedly applied in this manner. Using this process, a candidate for a
fundamental objective is identified when the response to WITI test is independent of
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any other objective. In other words, when an objective is important on its own merit,
and not merely because it supports another objective, it may represent a fundamental
objective (Keeney, 1992:66).
Keeney goes on to caution that both fundamental and strategic objectives satisfy
the WITI test for a means objective (emphasis added), and states that a legitimate
fundamental objective should only be influenced by alternatives within the decision
context. If a candidate fundamental objective can be influenced by alternatives outside
the decision context, then a means objective that supports the candidate fundamental
objective is the actual fundamental objective (Keeney, 1992:67).
Relating Values to Each Other

Application of the WITI test begs the question “how important is this?” It is not
enough to say an objective has value, but a method is needed to determine what
objectives have more weight than others. To this end a model called a value hierarchy
can be constructed to depict the relationships of the objectives to each other. The
hierarchy depicts the strategic objective at the top, with the fundamental objectives that
support it in the first tier. Each fundamental objective consists of its own supporting
objectives in the second tier. This pattern continues until the base level is reached
(Kirkwood, 1997:13). This final level consists of objectives that cannot be broken
down further into more basic elements. An example of a generic value hierarchy is
shown in Figure 9:
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Strategic Objective
Fundamental
Objective 1

Fundamental
Objective 2

Fundamental
Objective 3

Supporting
Objective 1.1

Supporting
Objective 2.1

Supporting
Objective 3.1

Supporting
Objective 1.2

Supporting
Objective 2.2

Supporting
Objective 3.2

Supporting
Objective 2.3

Figure 9. A Generic Value Hierarchy. An illustration of how a strategic objective,
fundamental objectives, and supporting objectives are structured.

This model forms the basis for scoring alternatives to determine which contributes the
most to satisfy the strategic objective.
When the value hierarchy is completed, attributes (measures) are identified that
represent measurement of the base level objectives (Kirkwood, 1997:24-28). Attributes
are quantifiable qualities that measure the degree of attainment of the lowest tier
objectives. Other terms used include measure of effectiveness, measure of
performance, and criterion (Keeney, 1992:100).

Keeney goes on to identify three categories of attributes: natural, constructed,
and proxy (Keeney, 1992:101). Natural attributes are those that can directly be
interpreted without much specialized knowledge. For example, coverage area directly
expresses how much of the earth’s surface is accessible to a satellite, without much
specialized knowledge needed to understand its meaning. Constructed attributes are
those developed specifically for a given decision context (Keeney, 1992:102). An
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example of a constructed attribute is the G/T ratio (gain-to-noise temperature) used to
specify the performance of communications antennas; a more commonly encountered
one is the system used to rank universities by national periodicals. Particular measures
such as money donated by alumni and SAT scores are developed, weighted, and added
together to form a score by which alternatives are ranked. Proxy attributes (proxies, for
short) are used when direct measures cannot be easily identified. Proxies substitute for
direct measures on the basis of a “perceived relationship” to the achievement of an
objective (Keeney, 1992:103). Keeney uses the relationship of pollution to structural
damage to illustrate this concept. Where an objective in environmental planning may
be to minimize this kind of damage, a direct measure may be difficult to identify. In
this case sulfur dioxide concentration could be used as a proxy attribute to indicate
damage to structures (Keeney, 1992:103). Kirkwood distinguishes proxies by
contrasting them with direct attributes, which offer a direct means of measuring the
attainment of an objective, as opposed to associating it with a substitute measure
(Kirkwood, 1997:24).
Attributes are the numerical input into single dimensional value functions
(SDVFs), which score the value of each level of attainment for each attribute on a
common scale. The simplest SDVF is linear in form, where value increases or
decreases linearly as the level of attribute attainment increases.
Kirkwood (1997:62-68) recommends two types of SDVFs: piecewise linear and
exponential. The piecewise linear SDVF is assessed with the assumption that the value
of each attribute will change linearly for one or more increments of increase in
measure. The rate of increase need not be the same for the entire scale; the change in
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value added (or decreased) may indeed vary over various portions of it. A hypothetical
example of a piecewise linear SDVF is shown in Figure 10, where value increases at
different linear rates over the measurement scale of the attribute.
1
0.9
0.8

Value

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0

10

20

30

Attribute

Figure 10. A Hypothetical Increasing Piecewise Linear SDVF.

The exponential SDVF allows for increasing or decreasing returns to scale, as
shown in equation (2) for a monotonically increasing value function,

 1 − exp  − ( x − x )

0

ρ 




v(x) = 1 − exp  − (x * − x 0 ) ρ 



 x − x0
 x * − x0


ρ ≠ infinity

otherwise

and in equation (3) for a monotonically decreasing value function:
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(2)

 1 − exp  − (x * − x )


ρ 




v(x) = 1 − exp  − (x * − x 0 ) ρ 



 x * −x
 x * − x 0

ρ ≠ infinity

(3)

otherwise

where exp [·] denotes the exponential function, x is the attribute under consideration, x*
represents the highest value that x can attain, x0 is the lowest value for x, and ρ is a term
called the exponential constant which determines the shape of the value function. For
ρ>0 the SDVF will be concave, for ρ<0 the SDVF will be convex, and as ρ approaches

infinity the SDVF will approach linearity.
When the maximum increase or decrease in value occurs in the middle of the
attribute scale the S-curve value function may be most appropriate. This function
depicts slow changes in value at the extremes of the attribute scale, but rapid changes
near the center. A hypothetical decreasing S-curve function is illustrated in Figure 11.
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Figure 11. A Hypothetical Decreasing S-curve SDVF.
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The exponential SDVF can also be used to express the decision maker’s attitude
toward risk (Kirkwood 1997:138-139). When applied in this fashion it is called the risk
tolerance, with risk aversion expressed by ρ>0, risk seeking by ρ<0, and risk neutrality
by ρ → infinity. When the decision maker’s attitude toward risk is assessed in this
manner, the value function is termed a utility function and is denoted by u(x).
Finally, the additive linear value function is formed by weighting the SDVFs
according to the preferences of the decision maker and then summing.10 The equation
for the hierarchy shown in Figure 12 has the following form:
v(X1, X2, …, Xn) = w1v1(X1) + w2v2(X2) + ··· + wnvn(Xn)

(4)

where each Xi is the score for each attribute, the vi’s are the SDVFs for each attribute,
the wi’s are the global weights for each value elicited from the decision maker, and n is
the number of attributes. With all vi(Xi) bounded by 0 and 1, equation (4) expresses the
value of an alternative in such a fashion that the least possible score is 0, and the best
possible score is 1.

Strategic Objective

X1
Attribute 1 (w1)

X2
Attribute 2 (w2)

Xn
Attribute n (wn)

Figure 12. Hierarchical Display of a Single-Tier Additive Value Function With 3 Attributes

10

Kirkwood (1992:253) also describes a value function form called the multiplicative utility function,
which takes the risk preference of the decision maker into account and is usually determined by direct
assessment (1992:254).
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Equation (4) expresses the value function as a linear combination of the
attributes. Many sources in the literature (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976:230), (Keeney,
1992:134), (Kirkwood, 1997:249), (Clemen and Reilly, 2001:652) state that attributes
must be additive independent for the linear additive value model to hold, and that
additive independence requires that all attributes be mutually preferentially
independent. This essentially means that the preference ordering of the consequences
of any attribute do not depend on the level of attainment of any other attribute or set of
attributes.
To this point value hierarchies that contain only a single tier of fundamental
objectives below the strategic objective have been addressed. For hierarchies with
more than one tier below the strategic objective there exist three schemes of weighting.
Non-hierarchical (or global) weighting is used to value each attribute against every
other in the hierarchy (Stillwell, von Winterfeldt, and John, 1987:443), thus expressing
each attribute’s contribution to the strategic objective on a global basis. Global
weighting takes place entirely at the bottom level, with the weights of all attributes
summing to 1. For hierarchies constructed using a bottom-up approach (the Silver
Standard) global weighting may be most appropriate, but for hierarchies with large
numbers of attributes this scheme requires numerous value judgments to be made.
Hierarchical (or local) weighting assesses the weight of each objective according to its
contribution to the objective immediately above it (Stillwell et al., 1987:443), with the
weights of the values that comprise a single objective summing to 1. As these
assessments reflect judgments made regarding contributions to a single objective, this
method may be most appropriate for values constructed using a top-down approach (the
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Gold Standard) that identifies values by breaking down fundamental objectives into
their sub-objectives. Stillwell et al. also briefly describe a higher-level value hierarchy,
with attributes and weights assessed at the upper-level tiers of the hierarchy (Stillwell et
al., 1987:443). This thesis will only consider local and global weighting schemes.

Clemen and Reilly (2001:625) address the manner in which an attribute’s
overall weight within a locally weighted multiple tier hierarchy can be found. The
overall weight for a single attribute is calculated by multiplying its local weight by the
local weight of each objective directly above it up to and including the first tier. For
the hierarchy in Figure 13, global weights for supporting objectives 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3
would be 0.3 X 0.4 = 0.12, 0.3 X 0.4 = 0.12, and 0.3 X 0.2 = 0.06, respectively.

Strategic Objective
Fundamental
Objective 1 (0.4)

Fundamental
Objective 2 (0.3)

Fundamental
Objective 3 (0.1)

Supporting
Objective 1.1 (0.5)

Supporting
Objective 2.1 (0.4)

Supporting
Objective 3.1 (0.7)

Supporting
Objective 1.2 (0.5)

Supporting
Objective 2.2 (0.4)

Supporting
Objective 3.2 (0.3)

Supporting
Objective 2.3 (0.2)

Figure 13. Generic Value Hierarchy With Local Weights Added.

Kirkwood specifies the characteristics a value hierarchy should have:
completeness, nonredundancy, decomposability, operability, and small size (Kirkwood,
1997:16). Completeness means that every key value of the decision maker should be
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included in the model; omitting one or more would not fully evaluate an alternative
under consideration. This concept is also called collective exhaustiveness (Keeney,
1992:78). Nonredundancy requires that each value be counted only once in the
hierarchy; double counting would give a value disproportionate weight in the model.
Related to nonredundancy is mutual exclusivity (Keeney, 1992:78), which specifies
that each objective in a hierarchy should be defined in such a manner that its
components can be clearly separated into clearly discrete components. This is often
combined with the preceding characteristic to form the MECE (mutually exclusive,
collectively exhaustive) principle.
Decomposability occurs when the contribution of one measure is independent of
the contribution of the others. An example of a value that is not decomposable comes
from Kirkwood: in the context of looking for employment, suppose that the value
“economic issues” consists of “pension benefits,” “salary,” and “medical coverage.”
The value of a good salary may be offset by a bad pension or bad medical plan. In this
case “economic issues” is not decomposable, as a change in one of its sub-values
affects the others (Kirkwood, 1997:18).
Operability is the usability of the hierarchy to the decision maker. For example,
in a large military command a value hierarchy should be constructed in a manner such
that the commander can understand and use it, whether he/she is by specialty an
operator, a logistician, or acquisitions officer, or a specialist of any other type.
Finally, the value hierarchy should be as small as possible in order to avoid
including factors that do not have an impact on the decision. For example, when
purchasing an automobile the color may be this kind of factor. If alternatives are
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available in all acceptable colors, or perhaps in only one color, it may not be necessary
to include in the hierarchy (Kirkwood, 1997:19).
Keeney and Raiffa (1976:41-43) advocate keeping value hierarchies as small as
possible. When specifying objectives from the strategic objective downward,
theoretically the hierarchy could be extended to an “absurd length” by including a subhierarchy for every individual affected by the decision (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976:43).
In their illustrative example of passenger transportation in the Northeast Corridor, this
number could reach 50 million people. Although their example describes an unrealistic
size for a hierarchy, it does serve to make the point for keeping the size of an actual
hierarchy manageable.
This appendix has reviewed the basic principles of VFT. For more specific
details the reader is referred to Kirkwood (1997), Keeney (1992), Clemen and Reilly
(2001), and Keeney and Raiffal (1976).
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Appendix B. Preliminary Value Hierarchies Derived from Doctrine Using
Content Analysis and Affinity Grouping.

To illustrate the values inherent in national security space doctrine, an extended
excerpt from a technical report completed by Loftis in October 2002 follows. Within
this appendix all references to “this study” or “this analysis” refer to the technical
report, and not to the analysis accomplished described in the main body of the thesis.
To obtain the values comparable to those that might have been elicited using a
Silver Standard approach with a panel of experts, content analysis using inductive
category development was used to collect both explicit and implied objectives from
three national security space doctrine documents. Affinity grouping was applied to
form the first two tiers of the value hierarchies, which were then compared with two
previous value hierarchies, one of which was accomplished using the Gold Standard
approach (SPACECAST 2020), with the other using the Silver Standard (ASIIS). The
hierarchies extracted from doctrine were intended as preliminary studies, and as such
were not weighted and only developed through the top two tiers.
This study led to two conclusions. First, the analysis method used uncovered
doctrinal values that retained the capability focus of SPACECAST 2020, such as
“reduce vulnerability” and “ensure freedom of action in space,” but also values that
depict how to organize and manage national security space activities, such as “ensure
unity of command” and “focus diverse national security space activities.” Further study
into constructing proxy attributes is recommended in order to capture the organization
and management values. The second conclusion is that doctrine now advocates raising
the profile of national security space activities to the level of the highest national
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security priorities, as evidenced by “elevate space issues to highest levels” and
“promulgate space advantages to national security community.” This represents a
departure from previous assessments of national security space values, which as
mentioned previously, have been focused on capabilities.
Problem Statement

A New Look at the Value of Space
In January 2001 the Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Organization Management and Organization issued its final report,
recommending sweeping changes in the way the U.S. utilizes space for national
security purposes. The scope of the report encompasses all U.S. space activities that
contribute to national security (hereafter called national security space), including both
Department of Defense (DOD) activities and other systems that belong to non-DOD
national agencies. As many of the changes recommended in the report (hereafter
referenced as the Space Commission Report) have been implemented, it represents not
only a shift in thinking with respect to national security space, but also a shift in action.
The focus of this analysis is to examine systematically the change in national security
space values after the release of the Space Commission Report, with the result being a
doctrine-based value model which will provide a backdrop for more conventional
elicitation from subject matter experts.
Doctrine presents fundamental principles for the employment of forces (JP-1,
2000:vi). It continually evolves as lessons learned over time are incorporated into a
common frame of reference to give military commanders and their subordinates a
common frame of reference for conducting operations. Doctrine “provides the distilled
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insights and wisdom gained from experience in warfare and other operations requiring
the use of the military instrument of national power” (JP-1, 2000:I-8).
With the broad changes recommended by the Space Commission Report taking
center stage in the space policy arena, a reexamination of what the national leadership
values from space is in order. To this end, and to set the stage for further discussion of
national security space values, three sources of space doctrine were identified for this
analysis: the Space Commission Report Executive Summary, Joint Doctrine for Space
Operations (JP 3-14, draft), and Space Operations (AFDD 2-2). These three

publications cover space doctrine from the national, joint, and Air Force perspectives,
respectively.
Although the Space Commission Report is not doctrine, it was selected for the
study because of the value implications of the fundamental changes its authors
recommend for accomplishing the nation’s objectives in space. As its purpose is to
assess management and organization of national security space, it does not address the
full breadth of issues contained in doctrine. It does, however, specify national-level
objectives for national security space, including activities outside the Department of
Defense (Space Commission Report, 2001:2). The analysis was limited to the
executive summary of the report.
Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations (draft) was selected
due to its status as the highest level of space doctrine within the DOD. Military
operations are almost always conducted jointly, and the joint perspective cannot be
ignored in a study of doctrine, especially when such guidance comes from the highest
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level of military command. At the time of this study JP 3-14 (draft) was only available
in draft form.
One of the Space Commission’s recommendations was to establish the Air
Force as the DOD’s executive agent for space, citing the Air Force’s budget authority
for 85% of national security space assets (Space Commission Report, 2001:55). As this
recommendation has been implemented, an examination of official Air Force space
doctrine was key to this study. The 1998 version of this doctrine was analyzed, and
analysis of the recent 2001 version is recommended to complete the picture of national
security space values.
The approach of this study is descriptive, not prescriptive. The intent is not to
judge the content of doctrine on its merits, but to determine in a systematic manner the
full set of values expressed in different doctrinal texts, and to compare them with values
asserted by previous doctrinal texts. Critical normative judgments about national
security space values are left to the decision makers themselves.
The terms doctrinal document and doctrinal text are used in this study to
include both doctrine stated as such and policy papers from which doctrinal values can
be extracted. Additionally, the term national security space is preferred in this study
over military space to account for the non-military space operations concepts covered
by the Space Commission Report.
Previous Efforts to Identify Values Using Doctrine
Previous approaches to identify values from doctrinal documents include Doyle,
Deckro, Jackson, and Kloeber (1997), in which fundamental objectives for information
operations are extracted as they are stated in the documents, and then evaluated for
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suitability for a value hierarchy. Their results indicate that no document that by itself
provided a complete basis for identifying information operations values, “indicating
that an information warfare value model must be sought outside this context” (Doyle et
al., 1997:46).

Another example of identifying values from doctrine comes from Kerchner,
Deckro, and Kloeber (2001). In this case a value hierarchy was developed to value
psychological operations (PSYOPS), with the strategic objective coming from joint
psychological operations doctrine, and its supporting objectives coming from
definitions in Army Field Manual 33-1 (Kerchner, Deckro, and Kloeber, 2001:46-47).
At this point, with the strategic objective and its supporting fundamental objectives
determined from doctrine, a team of PSYOPS experts developed the remainder of the
hierarchy.11
Kloeber (1995) identified values from Army doctrine. Citing Army Field
Manual FM 100-5, Airland Battle Doctrine, he developed quantitative measures for the
five tenets of Army operations: agility, initiative, depth, synchronization, and versatility
(Kloeber, 1995:12-14). These tenets (or values) were not necessarily directly
measured. For example, one measure of synchronization was “combined arms,” in
which a variation value was computed in the same fashion as population variance. The
data points were the various battlefield operating systems used in an operation. A high
variance indicated a “lack of balance among the different combined arms, whereas a
low variation indicat(ed) a very balanced effort” (Kloeber, 1995:151).
These studies extract explicitly stated values from doctrine, but no mention of
implied values is made. Essentially, the only values identified are the ones that
11

Value hierarchies are explained in greater detail in Appendix A of the thesis.
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doctrine says are values. The present study approaches value identification from
doctrinal documents in a different manner. The entire basic content of doctrinal
documents is analyzed for objectives, with the premise that all stated objectives must be
examined to identify the set of values held by the doctrine’s authors. As doctrinal
content is analyzed, values are identified when patterns emerge among the objectives
extracted. As the same or similar objectives reappear they can be collected using the
affinity grouping process, and structured into a hierarchy using value-focused thinking
(VFT) concepts. Focusing on objectives directed by doctrine, the analysis excluded
supplementary portions of doctrine such as appendices that merely serve to support the
main text.
Doyle et al. (1997) did not have the advantage of an existing value hierarchy for
information warfare with which to compare their results. Such a hierarchy for national
security space does exist in the form of the operational analysis for SPACECAST 2020,
a 1994 study directed by the chief of staff of the Air Force (CSAF) to “identify and
conceptually develop high-leverage space technologies and systems that will best
support the warfighter in the twenty-first century” (SPACECAST 2020 Operational
Analysis, 1994).

Drawing heavily on draft joint doctrine, a team of experts was assembled to
develop a quantitative method of assessing new systems concepts and technologies for
their value in meeting anticipated requirements of the warfighter. As a starting point
values were extracted from the four basic types of space operations listed in JP 3-14
(draft, 1994): force application, force enhancement, space control, and space support.
Using this top-down approach the SPACECAST 2020 team then decomposed these
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four first-tier values into progressively more detailed sub-values until they arrived at
qualities that could be measured (SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis, 1994).
Doctrine was used in this case as a launching pad for an effort to identify the attributes
that measure the value of national security space activities; however, there was no focus
on the doctrine itself.
Without extracting values from doctrine in such a manner that they are
established to be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, it is possible that the
values will overlap (e.g., Space Support may not be exclusive of Force Enhancement).
It is also possible that they may not cover all of the guidance contained in space
doctrine (e.g., insights about organization of space forces may be missed). To illustrate
this point, the SPACECAST 2020 value model will be presented later in this study as a
reference against which the value models extracted from space doctrine will be
compared.
The Aerospace Integrated Investment Study (ASIIS) was accomplished in 1999
as a joint effort between Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Force Space Command
(AFSPC) to provide an integrated framework for air and space force modernization
analysis, as well as to help each command develop its own internal investment plan
(Scitor and ANSER, 1999:35). The value model for this analysis was derived from a
draft version of Air Force Vision 2015 (Lehmkuhl and Tedeschi, 2000), and was
tailored from its original ASIIS form to one that specifically captured AFPSC’s values
by deleting those values not relevant to AFSPC (Lehmkuhl, 1999). The model was
used to facilitate trade-off decisions for air and space integration studies (Scitor and
ANSER, 1999:34-35), and clarified several measures used in AFSPC’s previous model
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used for mission area assessment (MAA). This value model, called the AeroSpace
Investment Model (AIM), will be presented below as a reference for comparison with
the space doctrine hierarchies.
The focus of this study is to identify all the values that national security space
doctrine. The approach taken borrows from both the Gold Standard and the Silver
Standard methods. By using a systematic method that encompasses the entire
document, a complete picture of what doctrine says is important is formed that includes
not only operational capabilities such as those listed in SPACECAST 2020, but other
concepts that have traditionally received less focus, due to the intent of previous
studies. For example, some of draft JP 3-14 addresses command relationships of space
forces under various conditions (draft JP 3-14, 2001:III-1 to III-2); this aspect was
missed with the top-down approach of SPACECAST 2020 that started the value
hierarchy with the four types of space operations. A systematic approach that addresses
the whole message of space doctrine is needed to ensure both stated and implied values
are identified. The systematic approach this study integrates concepts from content
analysis to identify objectives, affinity grouping to aggregate them into values, and
Value-Focused Thinking to build a value model.
Methodology

Application of Content Analysis
Objectives are often directly stated or implied in organizational directives,
policies, and, as this and many other studies have shown, doctrine. These documents
provide in written form directions toward accomplishment of objectives. It is the
premise of this study that the content of directive documents can be systematically
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analyzed in order to elicit values from stated objectives. This study is intended to be a
preliminary assessment of military space values, and the results herein will be most
useful as a springboard to direct elicitation from an actual.
Content analysis dates back at least to eighteenth century Sweden, where it was
used to settle a religious controversy over whether a collection of songs carried
dangerous and dissentious ideas (Krippendorff, 1980:13). By the twentieth century it
had evolved into a discipline and was applied in the fields of psychology, sociology,
and political science. The arrival of computerized data processing in the 1950’s made it
easy to accomplish the repetitive processes of coding and quantifying textual content.
Krippendorff has concluded that “content analysis has evolved into a scientific method
that promises to yield inferences from essentially verbal, symbolic, or communicative
data.” (Krippendorff, 1980:20).
According to Weber, content analysis can be used to make inferences from text;
he lists among its uses “(to) reveal the focus of individual, group, institutional, or
societal attention” (Weber, 1990:9). This study will show that by uncovering the focus
of institutional attention of a doctrinal text in a systematic manner by identifying
objectives, the doctrine’s values can be inferred, and can form the basis of a value
hierarchy that can be used as an organizational decision-making tool.
Weber lists the following eight steps for creating a coding scheme for analyzing
a text for content (Weber, 1990:21-24):
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1. Define the recording units
2. Define the categories
3. Test coding on a sample of text
4. Assess accuracy or reliability
5. Revise the coding rules
6. Return to Step 3 (until the desired reliability has been achieved)
7. Code all the text
8. Assess achieved reliability or accuracy
These steps represent the ideal case where more than one human is available to code
text. Due to manpower constraints and the preliminary nature of this study, some of
these steps will be limited in their application. Where possible the impact of these
limitations on the reliability of the study will be addressed.
1. Define the recording units. Weber lists the possible units of a text to be
analyzed to include individual words, word senses, sentences, themes, paragraphs, or
even the whole text, depending on the objective of the study and reliability required
(Weber, 1990:21-23). Coding by individual word was eliminated primarily due to the
labor-intensive effort required and its narrow scope with respect to identifying
objectives. For example, the words “inception,” “is,” or “competent” by themselves do
not indicate objectives, but require more specificity. The multiplicity of word
meanings (the word “have” by itself can mean “possess” or be used to indicate the
present perfect tense of a verb) and time limitations also eliminate coding by individual
word.12 Coding by word senses (the same as coding by word, but accounting for
multiple meanings) was eliminated for the same reasons. Coding by sentence was
eliminated not because of its inadequacy in capturing an objective, but because a
sentence may contain more than one objective.
12

Using computer software designed for content analysis would alleviate this burden, and its use is
recommended for further study. Possible implications of this method include limitations on a computer’s
detection of meaning, much as spellcheckers in word processing software are limited in their ability to
gauge word usage.
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Krippendorff identifies units of analysis as physical, syntactical, referential,
propositional (and kernels), and thematic (Krippendorff, 1980:60-62). Physical units
are pages, issues of a newspaper, posters, and in the case of non-textual media, even
frames of film and units of broadcast time. No physical unit within doctrinal
documents is available as a candidate for identifying objectives. Syntactical units and
items are those that are “natural” relative to the grammar of the communications
medium, and do not require judgments of meaning. These are excluded from
consideration due to the judgment of meaning required to identify objectives.
Objectives may not appear “naturally” in doctrinal text; some interpretation may be
required to determine if a word or phrase directs action toward an objective or merely
sets up the context for an objective mentioned elsewhere. Referential units are used to
account for the various ways a particular object, event, person, act, country, or idea may
be mentioned (or referenced) in a text (e.g., interpreting Prohibition, the Eighteenth
Amendment, and Volstead Act as meaning the same thing). This type of unit would be
appropriate if one particular objective were under analysis, but the intent here is to
identify different objectives. Propositional units (and kernels) are required to possess a
certain structure or set of structures such as
subject/verb/object
Objectives in doctrinal text may have different structures, so restricting the analysis to
one specific structure or a set of structures runs the risk of missing those objectives
expressed in other forms.
As previously discussed, values are specified by objectives, and as stated above,
most coding units are too cumbersome or restrictive to capture objectives. The
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thematic unit described by Krippendorff, however, does allow for the judgment of
meaning required to identify objectives, and it best fits the purposes of this study.
Thematic units are
…identified by their correspondence to a particular structural definition of the
content of narratives, explanations, or interpretations. They are distinguished
from each other on conceptual grounds and are contrasted with the remaining
portion of irrelevant material by their possessing the desired structural
properties (Krippendorff, 1980: 62-63).
The conceptual ground on which this study distinguishes thematic units is the question
of whether or not a portion of text contains language that directs action toward an
objective. If a portion of text directs or recommends action, then it is interpreted as an
objective. It is then selected as a data point for analysis. In this manner the objectives
are identified for separating into categories as described below.
The objective-oriented language found in this study most often took the form of
a phrase containing an action verb, as the following example from the Space
Commission report shows:
Because of space capabilities the US is better able to sustain and extend
deterrence to allies and friends in our highly complex international environment.
(Space Commission Report, 2001:11)
Here the objective stated in the text is “sustain and extend deterrence,” and this
objective is the data point for analysis. The remainder of the sentence describes the
context for sustaining and extending deterrence — the US is the actor sustaining and
extending deterrence, it is only to be extended to “allies and friends,” the reason is our
space capabilities, and the setting is “our highly complex international environment.”
Decision alternatives aimed at satisfying the objectives of sustaining and extending
deterrence must fit within the bounds of the decision context: the US must be the actor,
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they must use space capabilities, allies and friends must be able to benefit from
deterrence, and the alternative must be workable in a highly complex international
environment.

2. Define the categories. The categories into which qualifying text falls are the values
implied by the objectives. Weber describes constructing a set of content categories on
the basis of a single concept (Weber, 1990:24), with the advantages being “intensive
and detailed analysis of a single theoretical construct,” and providing “an explicit
rationale not only for what is retained, but also for what is excluded from the analysis.”
In this study the single theoretical construct is the objective, and the categories are the
values implied therein. Affinity grouping was used to delineate the separate values into
a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive set.
This study identifies categories as the relationships between objective phrases
emerge. Mayring (2000) terms this procedure inductive category development. He
summarizes it as follows:
The main idea of the procedure is, to formulate a criterion of definition, derived
from theoretical background and research question, which determines the
aspects of the textual material taken into account. Following this criterion the
material is worked through and categories are tentative and step-by-step
deduced. Within a feedback loop those categories are revised, eventually
reduced to main categories and checked in respect to their reliability. If the
research question suggests quantitative aspects (e.g. frequencies of coded
categories) can be analyzed (Mayring, 2000: paragraph 12).
In this study the research question defines the criterion of definition as language that
directs action toward an objective, and the categories (the particular values) are not
determined ahead of time but arise in the course of the analysis of the text. The
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categories were revised and reduced during the affinity grouping process (described
below).
3. Test coding on a sample of text. To ensure that the scheme is practical for
the purposes of the study, a small sample of the text should be coded before applying
the scheme to the entire text. The following sample from the Space Commission Report
tests the scheme:
Advance US Tech Leadership
To achieve NS objectives, and compete successfully internationally, US must
maintain technological leadership in space. This requires a healthy industrial
base, improved S&T resources, an attitude of risk-taking and innovation, and
government policies that support international competitiveness. In particular,
the government needs to significantly increase investment in breakthrough
technologies to fuel revolutionary capabilities. Mastery of space also requires
new approaches that reduce significantly the cost of building and launching
space systems. Box: The US will not remain world’s leading space-faring
nation by relying on yesterday’s technology to meet today’s requirements at
tomorrow’s prices.
In Table 11 an example of the coding decisions is shown:
Table 11. Testing Coding Scheme on a Sample of Text.
Objective Phrases (data points)
Context
achieve NS objectives
compete successfully internationally
maintain technological leadership
requires
a healthy industrial base,
improved S&T resources,
an attitude of risk-taking and innovation
support international competitiveness.
significantly increase investment
fuel revolutionary capabilities
mastery of space
requires new approaches
reduce significantly the cost
(In box outside text)
remain world’s leading space-faring nation
not rely on yesterday’s technology
meet today’s requirements

NS = national security

in space

government policies
in breakthrough technologies

of building and launching space systems
US
(not) at tomorrow’s prices

S&T = science and technology
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Some questions arise when extracting objectives from this sample. Where do
the adverbs fall, with the objective or in the context? Should the second objective be
listed as “compete,” “compete successfully,” “compete internationally,” or “compete
successfully internationally?” Although the argument can be made that only the verb
directs action and the adverbs merely modify the verb, including the adverb in the
objective phrase specifies the objective more clearly, and allows for grouping with
other verbs that fall into the same context when forming the hierarchy.13 This places
the probability of error on the side of identifying some objectives too narrowly, as
opposed to missing them altogether. If an objective is identified too narrowly, the
affinity grouping process will aggregate it back into its broader context.
The context for an action can be presented in negative terms, such as in the last
sentence in the sample text. In this case the word “not” was added in parentheses to the
context, even though it appeared in text coded as an objective. Following the same
rationale as when keeping adverbs in order to retain context, the original meaning of the
text is retained.
According to the scheme, the recording unit for this analysis was language that
directs action toward an objective. The remainder of the text describes a decision
context, or scope of appropriateness for potential alternatives in a decision situation.
This study focuses on the values implied by the objectives, and, in accordance with the
single theoretical construct described above, are excluded from analysis.
4. Assess accuracy or reliability. Weber identifies three forms of reliability
pertinent to content analysis: stability, reproducibility, and accuracy (Weber, 1990: 17).

13

Using the affinity grouping process to categorize objective phrases into values is explained in the
section entitled “Inductive Category Development Using Affinity Grouping” on p. 25.
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Stability refers to the consistency achieved by the same coder coding the text multiple
times. This study did not test for stability due to time constraints. Reproducibility (also
called inter-coder reliability) refers to the consistency of results obtained by multiple
human coders. As this study only used one coder, reproducibility is assumed, as
objective phrases can readily be separated from the rest of the text. Accuracy refers to
consistency of coding against a recognized norm or standard. In this case the standard
to be used is the objective phrase, identifiable by a verb that directs action accompanied
by adverbs and objects that specify the context of the objective.
Deciding whether a portion of text describes an objective or a decision context
is, of course, subject to the coder’s interpretation. There is no way to avoid differences
in human interpretation of words, but using more than one coder, each working
independently, would be a way to narrow this bias to within an acceptable tolerance of
commonly held meanings. Weber notes this problem in estimating reliability, and
recommends that disagreements between coders be resolved only after the reliability of
the process has been estimated (Weber, 1990:23). The reliability of this study would be
increased by using more than one human coder. Due to the preliminary nature of the
study and manpower limitations, however, this was not practical. As the purpose of the
study was to identify candidates for space doctrine values to augment elicitation by
structured discussion, the effect of the absence of reliability testing is noted, but
assumed not to affect the results in a manner inconsistent with this purpose. It is
assumed in this study that another analyst coding the same texts using the same unit of
analysis (the objective phrase) under the coding scheme defined above would be able to
differentiate between portions of text that specify objectives and those that do not.
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Another study by a different analyst using the same methodology would verify whether
or not an acceptable degree of accuracy has been obtained.
5. Revise the coding rules. This step applies when the desired level of
reliability is not attained. Readers of this report interested in doing their own analysis
of space doctrine are invited to verify the results from this one in order to validate the
coding scheme. Additional analyses of the topic and comparison of results with those
presented in this report will improve the reliability of this analysis and its methodology.
6. Return to Step 3. This step applies until the desired level of reliability is
attained.
7. Code all the text. Every objective phrase identified by the coding scheme is
then extracted for the affinity grouping process described below.
8. Assess achieved reliability or accuracy. As mentioned in Step 4, if this
study were to be done using multiple human coders, resolution of any disagreements
between them would wait until all the text is coded. This prevents human collaboration
from masking weaknesses or inconsistencies in the rules themselves. Verification of
the reliability of this methodology by other analysts is invited.
Krippendorff acknowledges the subjectivity inherent in content analysis when
he notes “how categories are defined…is an art. Little is written about it.”
(Krippendorff, 1980:76). The subjectivity addressed by Krippendorff does not
diminish the results of this study, as its purpose is to use space doctrine values as a
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springboard for interactive value elicitation from “real-world” decision makers in the
national security space community, which itself will have a subjective component. 14
Inductive Category Development Using Affinity Grouping.
Forming categories as they emerge as the analysis proceeds is the textual analog
of the affinity grouping procedure, which gathers and categorizes ideas that emerge
during group brainstorming sessions. This method of systematically grouping data into
categories was developed by the Japanese anthropologist Jiro Kawakita, who used it to
assemble large volumes of detailed notes into categories by observing the patterns that
emerged from them (Brassard, 1989:18).
Affinity grouping was used for the Foundations 2025 model in AF 2025
(Parnell, Conley, Jackson, Lehmkuhl, and Andrew, 1998:1340-1344). The strategic
objective15 was taken from the CSAF’s original charge to the participants, “achieve air
and space dominance.” To obtain the objectives for the value hierarchy, the
participants were asked to identify tasks that supported the strategic objective and to
state them in the form of key action verbs (Parnell et al., 1998:1340). Verbs were
isolated from nouns to the greatest extent possible to avoid institutional bias. The verbs
were then aggregated into tasks by grouping related verbs together, thus encouraging
mutual exclusivity (Parnell et al., 1998:1341). The tasks, some of which were
decomposed into subtasks, formed the base level of the hierarchy. They were then
structured into a value hierarchy by applying the affinity grouping process again,
resulting in functions (awareness, reach, and power) that supported the strategic

14

To address the subjectivity of the single human coder (the author of this report), a brief description of
this coder’s experience is in order. The coder is an engineering graduate with some recent graduate-level
public administration study, and has served as a missile launch officer and missile procedures instructor.
15
Parnell et al. (1998) term this the “overarching objective.”
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objective, “achieve air and space dominance.” This analysis of national security space
doctrine followed a similar methodology, except that objective phrases containing
action verbs were used in place of the tasks identified by the AF 2025 participants.
Brassard defines the Affinity Diagram tool as follows:
This tool gathers large amounts of language data (ideas, opinions, issues, etc.
(sic)), and organizes it into groupings based on the natural relationship between
each item, and defines groups of items. It is largely a creative rather than a
logical process (Brassard, 1989:17).
A group brainstorming setting is an open system in which new ideas enter by
harnessing the creativity of more than one participant. In this open system the intent is
to generate new alternatives. In this study the system is limited to the text and the
coder, whose input is limited to what is observed in the text, in a fashion similar to Jiro
Kawakita’s original process.
Brassard lists seven steps in creating an affinity diagram (Brassard, 1989:2033):
1. Assemble the right team
2. Phrase the issue to be considered
3. Generate and record ideas
4. Display the complete cards
5. Arrange the cards into related groupings
6. Create the header cards
7. Draw the “finished” affinity diagram
1. Assemble the right team. Brassard states that a team must have the
“necessary knowledge to uncover the various dimensions of the issue” (Brassard, 1989:
20). His intent here is to have as many different perspectives as possible in order to
spur the creation of many ideas. Although this study is not aimed at generating new
ideas, but at identifying those already stated in text, the convergence of results obtained
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by multiple coders would more accurately capture values within an acceptable tolerance
of commonly held meanings. For reasons mentioned above, this study uses a team of
one.
2. Phrase the issue to be considered. At this stage in the study the issue to be
considered is whether a portion of text contains language that directs action toward an
objective.
3. Generate and record ideas. Brassard characterizes this as a brainstorming
step. Although this is a study of a closed system, the idea of gathering and recording
disparate pieces of information still applies. The goal is to dissect the material into
movable elements that can be rearranged as logical patterns emerge.
Brassard recommends recording the emergent ideas onto cards for team access
and mobility. Although this study does not use cards, the reference to cards in the
remainder of the steps is left to retain fidelity to Brassard’s explanation.
4. Display the completed cards. The cards to which Brassard refers are used so
all team members can have access to the ideas generated. In this one-coder study a
computer is used, and physical mobility is not an issue. In a multiple-coder study this
step would be valuable at Step 8 of Weber’s method for creating and testing a coding
scheme.
5. Arrange the cards into related groupings. This procedure is largely the same
as Step 2 in Weber’s process and in Mayring’s summary of inductive category
development. Brassard prefers the term groupings to categories to encourage
flexibility in the team’s thinking, but this study will ignore the distinction.
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6. Creating the header cards. Brassard’s header cards “capture(s) the central
idea that ties all of the cards together” (Brassard, 1989:31). In this study these are the
initial objectives that will be subjected to the WITI test in order to identify values.
7. Drawing the “finished” affinity diagram. This step finalizes the affinity
process. Brassard mentions “superheaders” that may be necessary to tie together
related groupings (Brassard, 1989:33). In this study the analog is the WITI test — if
two groupings appear to be related they may support the same value. Mutual
exclusivity must be enforced, and if the groupings are not mutually exclusive, then the
process should be repeated until mutual exclusivity is attained. An example of a
“finished” affinity diagram for the value “Reduce Vulnerability” can be found in Figure
14 below.
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Collect Intelligence
Understand Threats

Maintain intelligence capabilities
Collect(ing) intelligence from space
Collect information

Better understand intentions
Better understand motivations
Better understand capabilities
Take seriously the possibility of attack
US vulnerability reduced
Effects of surprise attack are limited
(Failure to) develop credible threat analyses
Provide timely, accurate estimates of threats

Defend Against Hostile Acts

Deter Hostile Acts
Deter evolving threats
Avoid space Pearl Harbor
Pursue deterrence objectives successfully
Deter hostile acts in, from space
Sustain deterrence to allies, friends
Extend deterrence to allies, friends
Deter threats
Extend deterrence concepts
Deter against hostile acts
Deter attack
Bolster deterrent effect
Deter attack on US interests
Deter hostile actions

Defend space assets against hostile acts
Negate hostile use
Defend against attacks
Defend against hostile acts in, from space
Pursue defense objectives successfully
Defend against evolving threats
Protecting peaceful use of space
Extend defense capabilities
Defend against hostile acts
Defend assets in orbit
Overcome their efforts to deny
Protect rights of nations

Defend interests in, from space
Defend US interests
Defend against hostile actions

Figure 14. Illustrative example of affinity grouping using objective phrases from
the Space Commission Report. Objective phrases were identified and grouped together to form
values on the basis of related meanings. These values were then grouped to form the value “Reduce
Vulnerability.” Some of the groups of values may be decomposed further, e.g., separate “defend interests
in space” and “defend interests from space,” (underlined in figure).
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Summary of Methodology
The content analysis the national security space doctrines analyzed in this report
used objective phrases as coding units. These phrases were then affinity-grouped to
form the upper levels of a value hierarchy for each. From these values the overarching
strategic objective for each doctrine was inferred by applying the WITI test. The
hierarchies that were extracted from doctrine were then compared with the existing
value hierarchy from SPACECAST 2020 and the ASIIS study to illustrate how the
values by which we measure space as a national security asset have changed.
Extracted Hierarchies

The extracted hierarchies for each doctrine are presented below, followed by the
hierarchies from the SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis and ASIIS. The
extracted hierarchies identified values two tiers deep, with the overarching strategic
objectives inferred from the first tier of values. These values set the stage for
identifying more specific values for the lower tiers of the hierarchies and developing
quantifiable attributes to support them. The ideal method to accomplish this would be
to discuss the meanings of the objective phrases with their authors, thus providing a
validation mechanism for the study. Absent this possibility, national security space
users and stakeholders are candidates for developing the remainder of the hierarchies.
Depending on whether users and stakeholders fall under the aegis of national, joint, or
Air Force space, the appropriate hierarchy (Space Commission, JP 3-14 (draft), or
AFDD 2-2, respectively) should be selected for completion.
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Space Commission Report

The decision context of the Space Commission Report Executive Summary was
the “organization and management of space activities that support U.S. national
security interests” (Space Commission Report:2). This produced a broader overarching
strategic objective than was found in strict military doctrine. The strategic objective
supported by the first tier of values is to “realize U.S. interests in space.”
The broad national scope and focus on organization suggest great complexity in
defining measures of merit at the basic level of the hierarchy. Unlike the SPACECAST
2020 Operational Analysis hierarchy, which was constructed over a span of four weeks

and required a “a broad selection of students and faculty from the Air Force Institute of
Technology, the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air War College, and Air
Command and Staff College,” (SPACECAST 2020, 1994) a fully enumerated value
model for all of national security space would require input from the leadership of
every national agency with an interest in space. The Space Commission Report
suggests there are seven Cabinet-level departments, five Senate committees, six House
committees, and a multitude of agencies (Space Commission Report, 2001:3). The
difficulty inherent in assembling such large number of government decision makers for
direct value elicitation argues strongly in favor of doctrinal document analysis as a
method of extracting national security space values. The model constructed recognizes
this difficulty, as illustrated by the value “Execute space development” which contains
the sub-value “Focus diverse national security space elements.” When the base level of
the hierarchy is developed, proxy attributes may bridge across their various
perspectives to reconcile the differences arising from the diversity of stakeholders.
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The hierarchy and definitions of values derived from analysis of the 386 objective
phrases in the report are presented in Figure 15.

Realize U.S. interests in space

Provide space support
to highest-level
decision-makers

Reduce vulnerability

Execute space
development

Realign space
thinking

Support national
civilian leadership

Create favorable
environment

Collect intelligence

Elevate space
issues to highest
government levels

Support national
military leadership

Develop space
expertise

Understand threats

Change
organizational
structure

Focus diverse
national security
space efforts

Deter hostile acts

Receive guidance
from POTUS

Defend against
hostile acts

Figure 15. Value Hierarchy Derived from Space Commission Report Executive
Summary (January 2001).
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Definition of Space Commission Report Values
Provide Space Support to Highest-Level Decision-Makers:
Support national civilian leadership — Ensure the President has resources required to
manage crises and conflicts.
Support national military leadership — Provide space-related services to augment air,
land, and sea forces in support of military operations.
Execute Space Development:
Create favorable environment — Encourage a risk-taking culture of innovation and a
friendly legal and regulatory environment with friendly “rules of the road” for
developing space expertise.
Develop space expertise — Create and sustain a cadre of space professionals, and
incorporate their expertise into new doctrine.
Focus diverse national security space efforts — Promptly merge disparate U.S. space
activities.
Reduce Vulnerability:
Collect intelligence — Gather information on potential sources of vulnerability.
Understand threats — Analyze information collected to provide a better understanding
of vulnerability.
Deter hostile acts — Deter actions hostile to U.S. interests.
Defend against hostile acts — Defend against hostile acts directed against U.S.
interests.
Realign Space Thinking:
Elevate Space Issues to Highest Government Levels — Position and fund U.S.space
organizations so that space activities are given attention commensurate with
their importance.
Change Organizational Structure — Streamline U.S. government offices to improve
management and oversight of space programs.
Receive Guidance from the President — Follow Presidential direction and guidance in
setting the course for national security space programs.
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JP 3-14 (draft)
The value hierarchy extracted from the 604 objective phrases of Joint
Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations (draft, 2001) is shown in Figure
16. Two of the values refer to operations in space: “provide responsive support to
supported CINC” and “optimize space resource usage.” These appear to lend
themselves to more measurable decomposition than the other two, “organize for space
operations” and “articulate the contribution of space,” which are more conceptual in
nature. Thus, the model for joint space doctrine shows that the joint doctrine authors
emphasize quantification of space values more than the Space Commission did, but did
not carry it as far the authors of SPACECAST 2020. The differing decision contexts
(technological vs. organizational/managerial) account for the differential emphasis on
quantification. As with the hierarchy for the Space Commission Report, when the base
level of the hierarchy is developed, proxy attributes may be an accurate measure of the
conceptual values.
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Accomplish the nation’s military
space objectives

Provide responsive
support to supported
CINC

Organize for space
operations

Optimize space
resource usage

Achieve desired
operational effects
on enemy

Refine decisionmaking process

Conserve available
resources

Ensure freedom of
action in space

Ensure unity of
command

Maximize effect on
adversary

Achieve dominant
battlespace
awareness

Integrate space
capabilities into
planning and operations

Minimize effect on
non-adversaries

Articulate the
contribution of space

Figure 16. Value Hierarchy Derived from Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space
Operations (draft) (April 2001).

Definition of JP 3-14 (draft) Values
Provide Responsive Support to Supported Theater Commander
Achieve desired operational effects on the enemy — Use space capabilities to deceive,
disrupt, deny, degrade, and destroy as necessary to remove any enemy
advantage from space.
Ensure freedom of action in space — Operate space systems toward the goal of
protecting space interests and gaining space superiority.
Achieve dominant battlespace awareness — Collect information, understand the
situation, predict hostile actions, and disseminate information throughout the
commander’s theater.
Organize for Space Operations:
Refine decision-making processes — Establish requirements and priorities, reduce
decision time, and codify insights so that decision-making processes are
organized for support of space operations.
Ensure unity of command — Ensure clear designation of supported and supporting
CINC, along with clear rules for designating command and control authority of
space assets
Integrate space capabilities into planning and operations — Integrate all space
capabilities (military, national, civil, commercial, and allied), the means for
their protection, their supporting industrial base, and National Guard and
Reserve space components into all facets of strategy, doctrine, education,
training, exercises, operations of US military forces.
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Optimize Space Resource Usage:
Conserve available resources — Reduce the number and type of forces needed to
achieve military objectives.
Maximize effect on adversary — Maximize the effect of weapons on the adversary
throughout the battlespace.
Minimize effect on non-adversaries — Minimize the effect of weapons on nonadversaries throughout the battlespace.
Articulate the Contribution of Space:
Examine and describe the role of space forces in accomplishing military
objectives by identifying space as a center of gravity and considering space in
development of courses of action.

94

AFDD 2-2 (1998)
As this analysis continues into Air Force-specific doctrine, it reveals a mix of
conceptual and quantifiable values similar to the doctrinal texts examined previously.
The more easily quantified values parallel some of those in the SPACECAST 2020
hierarchy, with “surveillance” appearing in each at the sub-value level, and “reduce
adversary’s benefit from space” in AFDD 2-2 being almost the same as “negation” in
SPACECAST 2020. As with the Space Commission Report and JP 3-14 (draft), proxy
attributes for less directly quantifiable values such as “Reach Out to Joint
Force/National Leadership/Civil Sector” may be the best means to measure what they
represent. The value hierarchy extracted from the 312 objective phrases of Air Force
Doctrine Document 2-2, Space Operations is shown below in Figure 17.
Exploit space to provide integrated
information superiority

Operate Freely
in Space

Induce Effects
on Adversary

Provide Superior
Global Situational
Awareness

Pursue Space
Capabilities

Promulgate Space
Advantages to National
Security Community

Gain Space
Superiority

Reduce
Adversary’s Benefit
from Space

Surveillance

Realize Unique
Advantages of
Space

Reach Out to
Joint Force

Maintain
Space
Superiority

Control
Decision Cycle

Detection

Complement
Air Capabilities

Reach Out to
National
Leadership

Interpret Data

Expand
Breadth of
Alternative

Reach Out to
Civil Sector

Disseminate
Information

Figure 17. Value Hierarchy Derived from AFDD 2-2. Space Operations (August
1998).
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Definition of AFDD 2-2 Values
Operate Freely in Space:
Gain Space Superiority — Gain control of activities conducted in and through the space
environment.
Maintain Space Superiority — Maintain control of activities conducted in and through
the space environment.
Induce Effects on Adversary:
Reduce Adversary’s Benefit from Space — Use lethal, nonlethal means to achieve five
major effects on adversary: deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and
destruction.
Control Decision Cycle — Increase friendly forces’ ability to detect, plan, and react
faster than adversary.
Provide Superior Global Situational Awareness :
Surveillance — Maintain a continuous, instantaneous presence over enemy territory not
available from terrestrial-based forces.
Detection — Detect enemy space and missile forces, and any alterations in the space
environment.
Interpret Data — Identify enemy space and missile forces, and characterize the space
threat environment.
Disseminate Information — Provide critical information essential to NCA (sic)
decision process in determining response to attack
Pursue Space Capabilities
Realize Unique Advantages of Space — Use space systems to full advantage to provide
unlimited range, rapid deployability, and unprecedented accuracy to friendly
forces.
Complement Air Capabilities — Leverage space and air capabilities to attain air
superiority early in the campaign.
Expand Breadth of Alternative Capabilities — Plan for use of civil, commercial, and
allied space systems to support multipurpose operations in the space medium.
Promulgate Space Advantages to National Security Community
Reach Out to Joint Force — Augment DOD space sys in order to enhance lethality,
precision, and agility of combat forces.
Reach Out to National Leadership — Employ multipurpose space systems as national
policy dictates to give our national leaders the presence and war-fighting
options needed for power projection.
Reach Out to Civil Sector — provide essential support and expertise to civil sector
agencies performing combat, noncombat MOOTW.
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At this point, the values identified from space doctrine are candidates to be
broken down into quantifiable measures, as was done in the ASIIS study and in Kloeber
(1995). To this end, interactive values elicitation with the decision makers and
stakeholders through structured interviews would be the ideal method of identifying the
quantifiable attributes needed to measure the value of national security space activities.
SPACECAST 2020
The value hierarchy constructed by the participants in SPACECAST 2020 used
the types of space operations and their corresponding capabilities from the 1994 version
of JP 3-14 (draft) as a starting point (SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis, 1994).
The SPACECAST 2020 participants then decomposed these values into quantifiable
attributes. Because of its use of both doctrine and interactive solicitation from experts,
this hierarchy was selected as a basis of comparison with the value hierarchies extracted
from current space doctrine.
As the decision context for SPACECAST 2020 was “to quantify and compare
different systems' contributions to various space capabilities,” (SPACECAST 2020
Operational Analysis:1), each value was decomposed into its sub-values and sub-sub-

values before quantitative measures of merit were identified. For example, within the
value Force Enhancement is the sub-value Communications, and it is broken down as
follows in Table 12:
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Table 12. Values and Weighting for the Force Enhancement Value in the
SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis Hierarchy.
Line
Item

OVERALL OBJECTIVE: Control and
Exploit Space

No.
Force
Crisis availability 0.35
EnhanceCommun Capacity
0.35
ment
ications
0.37
0.22

1
2

Interoperability

0.20

3

Security

0.10

4

Current
Level

Minor
Significant
Improvem Improvement
ent
(0.1)
(0.5)

Measure of
(0.0)
Merit
Initial # links in about 10
25
theater
Decompressed
300
600
MB/sec
Mbits/sec/l
ink
Common-use
Little
All AF
systems
systems
Level of secure
links

Corps

Division

Order of
Magnitude
(0.9)

100

1000's

1000

3000

All US
systems

US,
commercial,
intl.
Platoon

Battalion

From SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis, Appendix 1.

As the study of doctrinal text values only identified the first two tiers under the
overarching strategic objective, only the first two tiers of the SPACECAST 2020 model
are shown below in Figure 6.
The full hierarchy is displayed in Sub-Appendix 1. In Figure 17 below the top
two tiers and the overarching strategic objective of the SPACECAST 2020 value
hierarchy are presented.
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Control and Exploit Space

Space Support

Space Control

Force Enhancement

Force Application

Launch/Lift

Surveillance

Communications

Ballistic Missile
Defense

Satellite Control

Protection

Navigation and
Positioning

Air, Land and Sea
Defense from Space

Logistics of System

Negation

Intelligence and
Surveillance

Power Projection

Environmental
Monitoring and
Control

Mapping, Charting,
and Geodesy

Warning,
Processing, and
Dissemination

Figure 18. SPACECAST 2020 Operation Analysis Value Hierarchy (top two levels
changed from table format to hierarchy format).

AeroSpace Integrated Investment Study (ASIIS)
The ASIIS produced the Aerospace Investment Model (AIM) for Fiscal Year
2004. The overarching strategic objective, Vigilance, Reach, and Power, was taken
from the Air Force Strategic Vision from Fall Corona ’99 (Lehmkuhl, 1999), and the
first tier of values consisted of the following: Inform, Enable, Act. These and their sub-
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values touch on some of the less directly quantifiable values such as those shown in
Table 13:
Table 13. Examples of Proxy Attributes from AIM.
Bottom-tier Value
Inform — Command and Control — Maintain
Common Operational Picture

Example of “Soft” Attribute
Adequacy of Command Picture — Rating of
completeness of information by key operators
in the command and control chain
Inform — Command and Control — Develop
Responsiveness of Plans Developed — Rating by
Plans
development personnel as to the degree of
responsiveness of the products they produce
to create accurate command pictures
Inform — Command and Control — Execute
Plan Execution Capacity — Percent plans of
Plans
interest that can be coordinated at a command level
Enable — Prepare-Train-Space Operations —
Level of Impact of Evaluations on Systems —
Missile Operators
Level of impacts to missile operators from tests
and evaluations
Act — Mission Planning- Missile Operations
Wartime Scenario Support — The percentage of
wartime scenarios that can be adequately planned
within 3 hours. Adequate planning will address all
resources/support needed to make the missile
resource positioned appropriately or immediately
taskable as applicable
From ASIIS Candidate Measures, 2000 (document accompanying Lehmkuhl, 1999).

Completed in 1999, the space values identified in this study depict the shift
toward inclusion of “soft” values, which will need proxy attributes for measurement.
The top two levels of AIM, along with the strategic objective, are shown below in
Figure 7. The full model is presented in Sub-appendix 3.
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Vigilance, Reach, and
Power

Inform

Enable

Command and
Control

Act

Prepare

Mission Planning

Deploy

Navigate

Sustain

Protect

Figure 19. AIM Value Hierarchy (top two levels).
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Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions
The more recent national security space value hierarchies display a trend toward
values that represent qualities such as organization and planning that are not depicted in
SPACECAST 2020 (1994). This is somewhat expected, due to the original intent of
that study, which was to evaluate systems and technologies. The shift toward
organization and planning objectives began with AFDD 2-2 (1998) and continued with
the Aerospace Investment Model (1999), JP 3-14 (draft, 2001) and the Space
Commission Report (2001). Table1 4 depicts a comparison of the strategic objectives

and first tier values of each of these studies.
Table 14. Comparison of Strategic Objectives and First Tier of Values for the
Three Extracted Hierarchies and the Two Elicited Hierarchies.

SPACECAST
2020, 1994
(taken directly)
AFDD 2-2,
1998
(extracted)

ASIIS, 1999
(taken directly)
Space
Commission
Report, 2001
(extracted)
Draft JP 3-14,
2001
(extracted)

Strategic
Objective
Control and
exploit space
Exploit space
to provide
integrated
information
superiority
Vigilance,
Reach, and
Power
Realize U.S.
interests in
space

First Tier of Values
Space support
Space control
Force enhancement
Force application
Provide superior global situational awareness
Operate freely in space
Pursue space capabilities
Induce effects on adversary
*Promulgate space advantages to national security
community
Inform
Enable
Act
Provide space support to highest-level decision makers

*Execute space development
Reduce vulnerability
*Realign space thinking

Accomplish the Provide responsive support to supported CINC
nation’s military *Organize for space operations
Optimize space resource usage
objectives

*Articulate the contribution of space
* Values that represent “soft” qualities for which the SPACECAST 2020 value model does not account.
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This study finds that a sea change in space thinking has taken place over the last
eight years, as measured by the differing values that have emerged from value models.
Whereas SPACECAST 2020 using doctrine only as a starting point focused on directly
measurable attributes, the value models for the AIM study and from the space doctrinal
texts include concepts such as organization, integration, and command relationships. It
may be reasoned that this is not an unexpected result, given that the participants of
SPACECAST 2020 were charged with producing a model with which to evaluate
systems and concepts. This is precisely the point. What has changed is the direction set
forth by decision makers, whether it be expressed through doctrine or directed studies
such as SPACECAST 2020 and ASIIS. The direction not only encompasses directly
measurable operational capabilities, but has expanded to include measurement of
organization and planning not as easily measured. These are concepts that will require
proxy attributes to be constructed. For example, “Rating of completeness of
information by key operators in the command and control chain,” (AIM: Inform —
Command and Control — Maintain Common Operational Picture) will require a proxy
attribute to be constructed to define “key operators” and “completeness of
information.”
An additional conclusion of this study was reached. In addition to measuring
organizational aspects of national security space, doctrine now directs that the profile of
space and what it can contribute to national security should be raised. Each current
doctrinal source directs the elevation of space and its contribution to national security to
a prominent level of discussion within the national security community. With the
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importance given to articulating the contribution of space, doctrine now seeks to bring
space to the high ground of national security planning.
Recommendations
Kloeber (1995) has constructed proxy attributes to measure concepts such as
organizational agility (Kloeber, 1995:130-136) and combined arms (Kloeber 1995:147159), using time to publish orders and variance of the number of different types of
battlefield operating systems as primary inputs. An examination of these attributes may
lend insight to attributes that measure national security space organizational values.
Further study in this area is recommended for filling out the remainder of the
hierarchies.
As mentioned above, repeating this analysis by using different human coders is
recommended to validate the methodology used in this analysis. A convergence of
values from different analysts would indicate that the methodology is sound, while
divergence would indicate that the methodology should be revisited. Content analysis
software, although less capable than humans of discerning meaning from context, offers
a means to ensure the same assumptions are made throughout an analysis such as this
one. Further analysis is recommended in these areas.
A consideration that cannot be overlooked is that, although the Air Force has
been named the DOD’s executive agent for space, the other services have an interest in
national security space to support their missions as well. Similar analysis of Army and
Navy space doctrine is invited and recommended to determine if they value
organizational concepts in a manner similar to the doctrine reviewed in this study.
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Finally, doctrine is in a constant state of evolution. The 2001 edition of AFDD
2-2, Space Operations, has been recently made available, and a preliminary
examination revealed 738 objective phrases in it. Analysis using the method outlined
in this study is necessary to provide a complete assessment of the how deep the “sea
change” in national security space thinking has been.
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Sub-Appendix 1. Value Model from the SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis.
Presented in tabular form. The first three columns represent the three tiers of the
hierarchy, with attributes (measures of merit) for the base level of the hierarchy in the
sixth column. The complete study, with alternate future scenarios with varied weights
and alternatives scored is available at
http://www.au.af.mil/Spacecast/monographs/ops-anal.doc
SPACECAST 2020 VALUE MODEL

27
May
94

Hierarchy with weights (Spacecast 2020
"Standard World"):
Line
Item

OVERALL OBJECTIVE: Control and
Exploit Space

No.
Crisis
availability
Communications Capacity
0.22

Navigation &
Force
Enhance-

Positioning
0.20

ment

0.37

Intelligence &
Surveillance
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Wristwatch/ On one chip
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review only
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Sub-Appendix 1 (continued). Value Model from the SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis.
Current

Minor

Significant

Order of

Measure of Merit
## 28 Covered area

Level
(0.0)
--

Improvement
(0.1)
Most of Eurasia

Improvement
(0.5)
Half of globe

Magnitude
(0.9)
World

## 29 Track accuracy

--

3 m in atmos.

--

Warning of
RV/decoy
No 1-point

SPACECAST 2020 VALUE
MODEL (Part 2)
Acquisition & Coverage
Tracking
0.25
Accuracy

Discrimination ## 30 ID/Discrimination
Ballistic

Survivability

0.13

31

Qualitative
judgment

--

Missile
Defense

Force
Application

0.37

0.19

failures
Kill lethality

0.23

Timeliness

0.14

Coverage
Capacity

0.14
0.12

Acquisition & Coverage
Tracking
0.20
Accuracy
Air, Land,
& Sea
Defense
from
Space

0.27

32

Pk

0.17

0.13

Timeliness

0.23

Coverage
0.27
Acquisition & Coverage
Tracking
0.30
Accuracy
Power

---

-A few

Regional
100

--

Most of Eurasia

Half of globe

## 37

--

39

Qualitative
judgment

---

3 m, unmoving
3 m, large
tgt
moving tgt
ID ground targets Discr. mobile
ground
No 1-point

0.13

--

0.9, fixed targets

41 Required warning
time
42 Covered area
## 43 Covered area

--

Weeks

---

-Most of Eurasia

Regional
Half of globe

## 44

--

40

Pk

Accuracy

46

Qualitative
judgment

---

Kill lethality

0.17

47

Pk

Timeliness

0.22

Coverage

0.18

48 Required warning
time
49 Covered area
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major power
attack
0.9, ground/air
tgts
Minutes
Global
World

3 m, unmoving
3 m, large
tgt
moving tgt
ID ground targets Discr. mobile
ground
No 1-point
failures

0.37

1 m, ground or
air tgt
Discr.
ground/air
decoys
Some capacity Full capacity
concerted
attack
0.5, armored
vehicles
Days

Discrimination ## 45 ID/Discrimination

Projection Survivability

Global
Entire enemy
force
World

--

failures
Kill lethality

major power
attack
> 0.7 all
phases
Seconds

33 Required warning
time
34 Defended area
35 RVs handled at a
time
## 36 Covered area

Discrimination ## 38 ID/Discrimination
Survivability

concerted
attack
0.7 endo &
boost
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0.7
endoatmospheric
10 days
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--

3m
1m
everywhere
everywhere
Limited
Mid-course
discrimination discrimination
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1 m, ground or
air tgt
Discr.
ground/air
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--

0.9, fixed targets

--

10 days

concerted
attack
0.5, armored
vehicles
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--

--

Regional

major power
attack
0.9, ground/air
tgts
Seconds
Global

Sub-Appendix 1 (continued). Value Model from the SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis.
SPACECAST 2020 VALUE MODEL
(Part 3)

Current

Minor

Significant

Order of

Level
Improvement Improvement
Magnitude
Measure of Merit
(0.0)
(0.1)
(0.5)
(0.9)
Surveillance Availability
Coverage
## 50 Percent of space 90% Earth
All Earth
Cislunar
Heliocentric
orbits
orbits
space
orbits
0.33
Revisit Time
## 51 Time to view
10s of hrs
1-6 hrs
10-60 min
< 1 min
Robustness
Survivability
## 52
Qualitative
SingleNo 1-point
Some
Full capacity
judgment
point
capacity
failures
failures
concerted
major power
attack
attack
0.33
0.33
Maintainability ## 53 Time to restore Months +
Days
Hours
Seconds
Accuracy
Resolution
## 54 Target sample (classified)
1m
10 cm
1cm
distance
Space
0.33
Identification
## 55 Percent objects (classified) (classified)
85%
100%
ID'd
Control
Track/Predict
## 56 Avg # objects
500
100
10
0
lost
0.22 Protection
Active
Maneuver
## 57 Response time
Hours
1 hour
Minutes
Seconds
Delta Velocity
m/sec
10 m/sec
100 m/sec
km/sec
0.40
Jamming
## 58 Spectral range
Selected
Double #
All major
All RFs
bands
bands
bands
Decoys
## 59 Avg decoys /
0
0.5
1
10
S/C
Range of
-VIS
VIS+IR
VIS+IR+Radar
effectiveness
0.33
Defensive Fire 0.10 60
Pk
-0.1
0.2
0.7
Passive
Redundancy
## 61
Qualitative
SingleNo 1-point
Some
Full capacity
judgment
point
capacity
failures
failures
concerted
major power
attack
attack
0.60
CC&D
## 62
Pd
1
0.8
0.5
0.2
Hardening
## 63 Sure safe W on
1W
10 W
100 W
1 MW
target
Crypto
0.10 64 Percent S/C with
90%
100%
--Security
crypto
Negation
Target Acq
65 Time to produce Hours-days
2 hours
90 min
Minutes
state
0.20
vector after
launch
Destructive
Coverage
## 66 Percent of S/C
-10%
20%
70%
0.33
ASAT
Weapon
## 67 Avg # shots /
-0.1
1
10
Capacity
target
0.20
Effectiveness ## 68
Pk / shot
-0.1
0.2
0.7
Incapacitating Coverage
## 69
Percent of
-10%
20%
70%
systems
Systems
Effectiveness ## 70 Pr{incapacitate}
-0.1
0.2
0.7
0.60
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Sub-Appendix 1 (continued). Value Model from the SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis.
Current

SPACECAST 2020 VALUE
MODEL (Part 4)
Cost
Launch/
0.25
Lift
0.62 Responsiven
ess
0.20

Recurring
Non-recurring

## 71
## 72

Timeliness

0.17 73

Orbit range

0.17 74

Surge
0.17 75
capability
Mission range 0.17 76

Support
0.22

30%

40%

70%

90%

1x

2x

5x

10 x

2

Several

All current

0.1

0.5

0.9

Months

Weeks

Days

2-3%

1%

0.50%

2

5

10

Part noncryo/toxic
10%

Mostly noncryo/toxic
50%

All noncryo/toxic
90%

--

Many coastal
sites

All CONUS

Further
simplification

Like current
air ops

Mostly clean

Clean, low
waste

Missions
1
supported
Pr{soft
0
abort|abort}
Time to restart
Years
ops
Pr{destructive
5%
abort}
# locations/orbit
1
plane
Ease of handling Cryogenic/
toxic
Percent blue-suit
0%

Fuel

## 81

Ease of
handling
Launch
ranges

## 82
## 83

Number and
location

Cmd &
Control

## 84

Similarity to air
ops

One
coastal
site
Current
launch ops

Payload
Satellite Communicati
ons
Control Diagnosis
Survivability

0.10

85

Toxicity and
waste

High and
much

Like
Pegasus/
Taurus
Mostly
dirty

0.10

86

Type bases

Fixed/soft

Dispersed

Mobile/very
dispersed

0.05
0.33

87
88

Max lift/launch
Link reliability

50K
99.999%

100K
--

200K
99.9999%

many
/hardened/
mobile
-99.99999%

0.33

89

Hours

90 min

20 min

2 min

0.33

90

Avg time to
diagnose
Type ground
stations
HW failure
recovery

Sustainability S/C-adaptability
Logistic
s of
System

Hours

## 80

Environmenta
l
impacts
Survivability

0.40

0.18

Magnitude
(0.9)
$200/lb
$300M

Days

Locations

79

Improvement Improvement
(0.1)
(0.5)
$5,000
$2,000/lb
$5B
$2B

Order of

Weeks

Operability

0.17 78

Significant

Months

Reliability

0.15

0.20

Level
(0.0)
$6,500
$10B

Non-destruct
abort
Post-abort
restart
0.15

Space

0.17 77

Measure of Merit
Cost/lb to orbit
Develop/procure
cost
Required
warning time
Inclinations
achievable
Increase in rate

Minor

0.13 91

S/C-upgradability
Grd-maintenance
Grd--maint.
freq.
Grd--maint.
skills
Grd--parts

0.13 92

0.13 96

Grd--repair

0.13 97

0.13 93
0.13 94
0.13 95

Grd--reliability 0.13 98
Commonality

0.20

99

Interoperabilit
y

0.20

100

Depots/
Infrastructure

0.20

Design
provisions
Level of repairs
rqd
Frequency of
actions
Type of
personnel
Type of piece
parts rqd
% work value on
site
MTBF, critical
parts
S/C commonality

S/C
Interchangeabilit
y
101
Dual-use
technology

109

Soft,
US territory
worldwide
RedundLtd.
ancy only Reconfigureability
None
Limited
Component
Daily

Board

Mobile
Mainly mobile
backups
Major
Only minor
reconfiguremission losses
ability
Major
Mission changes
via S/W
LRU
S/W only

Monthly

Many months

Years

Contract
specialist
Specialize
d
100%

Mix contract

High-skilled
military
MIL-SPEC

5-level
Off the shelf

50%

10%

100% of
system life
Systemspecific
None

125% of
system life
Modular
subsystems
Alternates
available

150% of
system life
Reconfigure
designs
Standard
interface

200% of
system life
Assemble at
launch site
S/C on any
launcher

Ltd use,
components

Expand use

Some dualuse designs

All systems
dual-use

Mostly MILSPEC
75%

Sub-Appendix 2. Aerospace Investment Model (AIM) Value Hierarchy tailored to
AFSPC’s needs. The shaded areas represent values that were not applicable to AFSPC
and zeroed out.
1.0 Inform
1.2 Interpret

1.1 Sense

1.1.1 Air Events

1.1.1.1 Objects

1.1.1.2 Signals
1.1.2 Information
Systems Events
1.1.3 Missile Events

1.2.1 Process

1.1.5 Surface Events
1.1.5.1 Moving
Targets

1.2.2 Exploit

1.2.3 Report

1.1.5.2 Fixed
Targets

1.3 Communicate

1.1.5.3 Area
Targets

1.3.1 Telephony

1.1.5.4 NBC
1.3.2 Data Transfer

1.1.5.5 Signals

1.1.6 Space Environmental
Monitoring

1.4.2 Monitor
Friendly Forces
Status
1.4.3 Monitor
Enemy Forces
Status
1.4.4 Analyze/
Predict

1.3.4 Secure &
Survivable

1.4.5 Develop
Plans
1.4.6 Execute
Plans

1.1.7 Terrestrial
1.1.4 Space Events

1.4.1 Maintain
Common
Operational Picture

1.3.3 Video

1.1.3.1 Boost Phase

1.1.3.2 Post-Boost
Phase

1.4 Command & Control

Environmental Monitoring

1.1.4.1 Near Earth

1.1.4.2 Deep Space

1.1.4.3 Signals
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Sub-Appendix 2 (continued). Aerospace Investment Model (AIM) Value Hierarchy,
tailored to AFSPC’s needs. The shaded areas represent values that were not applicable to
AFSPC and zeroed out.

2.0 Enable

2.2 Prepare

2.3 Deploy

2.2.1 Test & Evaluate

2.3.1 Assets
Forward / to Theater

2.2.2 Train

2.2.2.1 Air Operations

2.2.2.1.1 Aircrews

2.2.2.2 Support
Personnel

2 .2 .2 .2 Space Operations

2.2.2.2.1 Missile
Operators

2.4 Sustain

2.4.1 Supply

2.3.1.1 Airlift

2.4.2 Maintain

2.3.1.2 Support
Equipment

2.4.3 Generate

2.3.2 Assets to Space

2.3.2.1 Routine
Launch

2.3.2.2 Contingency
Launch

2.4.4 Reconstitute/
Recover

2.4.5 Provide Services
2.4.5.1 Airfield
Operations

2.4.5.2
Medical

2.4.5.3 Base
Support

2.4.5.4 Safety

2.3.2.3 Reposition

2.2.2.2.2 Satellite
Operators

2.2.2.2.3 Other
Space & Missile
Operations Personnel
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Sub-Appendix 2 (continued). Aerospace Investment Model (AIM) Value Hierarchy,
tailored to AFSPC’s needs. The shaded areas represent values that were not applicable to
AFSPC and zeroed out.
3.0 Act

3.3 Protect

3.1 Mission Planning

3.3.1 Survival

3.1.1 Air Operations

3.1.2 Satellite &
Launch Operations

3.3.1.1 Of Air Weapon
Systems

3.1.3 Missile
Operations

3.3.1.2 Of
Information Systems

3.2 Navigate

3.3.1.3 Of Space
Weapon Systems

3.2.1 Airborne

3.3.1.4 Of Surface
Weapon Systems
3.2.2 Space

3.3.2 Escape

3.2.3 Surface

3.3.3 Rescue

3.3.3.1 Aircrews

3.3.3.2 Assets
in Space
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Appendix C. The Measures and Single-Dimension Value Functions.

General Notes
The values, measures, and single-dimension value functions (SDVFs) were
elicited from a set of 9 combat aircrew members representing three services. Four
structured discussions were held, interspersed with informal individual interviews.
Platforms represented were B-52, F-15C, F-15E, F/A-18, F-14, EA-6B, and CH-46.
Additional expertise was provided through electronic correspondence with USAF
Weapons School instructors, representing F-15C, B-52, HH-60, and space operations
perspectives.
The term subject matter expert (SME) is used below to represent a member of the
discussion while Weapons School experts are identified directly. The term air warrior is
used to represent all combat aircrews collectively.
Below is a brief commentary of how the scales and SDVFs were elicited,
followed by the measures and SDVFs.
Span
Span of communication was found to be poorly represented by continuous
numerical scales. Additional distance does not represent additional value to the air
warrior, and in some cases it represents less. The ability to communicate across
categories of operating locations — area of responsibility (AOR) (the example given was
southern Iraq), unified command (the example given was USCENTCOM), hemisphere,
and the globe — are considered more accurate discriminants of value. The air warriors
deem hemispherical and global span of communications to be relevant for measuring
reach-back support communication to CONUS locations, and that the AOR and unified
command categories were appropriate for measuring coordination in a joint warfighting
environment.
Bandwidth was used as a proxy to represent the volume of information. Although
bandwidth does not account for modulation and other schemes of compressing
information into a signal, it served as a jumping-off point from which an idea of how
much improvement over current capability is desired. The scales for bandwidth are thus
expressed as improvement over current capability (e.g., 0 = no improvement over current,
1 = 100% improvement). Although it could be argued that bandwidth would more
logically fall under a value such as capacity or volume, the SMEs addressed this and
agreed that bandwidth is a constituent of what they termed span of communications.
A common refrain in the discussions over bandwidth was that it feeds its own
desire. “If you give me more I will want more” was the common sentiment, from both
the SMEs in the facilitated discussions and the experts at the Weapons School. This was
particularly true with respect to data communications, especially imagery. One of the
examples brought forth by the SMEs was that an imaging capability of 30 frames per
second would make the air warrior want 80 frames per second. To represent the
insatiable demand for data, a logarithmic scale was selected with a factor of 1000 times
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the current capability as the upper extreme. The SDVF selected was increasing
exponential, and this was validated by the Weapons School experts.

Reliability
Reliability was found to be a critical measure. The SMEs noted that the lack of
reliable communication would negate other values represented in the hierarchy.
Reliability was defined as the expected time available (uptime) during a particular phase
(pre-flight or in-flight), expressed as a percentage of that phase. Thresholds of reliability
were established at the base level of the communication branch. The SMEs decided that
less than 75% communication reliability in the pre-flight planning timeframe would
negate the value accorded to it under span. They set a similar threshold for in-flight
communication at 90%.
Reliability was also identified as a measure of navigation. The SMEs determined
that it was less important in the pre-flight phase and set the maximum of the scale at 50%.
The minimum of the in-flight scale, however, was set at 90% reflecting the importance of
recency of update. There were no negating thresholds identified for navigation.
Positioning and Timing Error
Horizontal error and altitude error as measured from true latitude, longitude, and
altitude above sea level constitute what the air warrior values in positioning. Although
navigation error is commonly measured in meters by the space community, the SMEs
thought that feet would be a more familiar unit for air warriors. The SDVF that
represents in-flight horizontal error stands out as the only piecewise linear SDVF in the
model, representing a “sweet spot” in the middle where value decreases rapidly as error
increases, beginning at 50 ft.
Decreases in timing error, as measured by difference from true “Zulu” time, were
found to have greater value in the pre-flight phase than in in-flight. The SDVFs for each
were decreasing inverse exponential and decreasing linear, respectively, which reflect a
greater “payoff” on minimizing error before takeoff.
Timeliness
Navigation timeliness is defined as the delay from update request to update
receipt. The air warrior is not concerned about navigation update delay before takeoff,
but highly values rapid updates while in the air. On a decreasing inverse exponential
scale of 0 to 60 seconds, a value of 0.5 is reached at approximately 5 seconds, less than a
twelfth of the distance to the minimum value.
Denial Measures
The SMEs valued any space capability that could deny an adversary military
capabilities of his own. Without specific alternatives available to constrain their thinking,
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this was the most value-focused part of the model. Information denial and threat
destruction comprise the first-tier value of denial, with information denial consisting of
the other two values found in the first tier, with almost the same structure. The rationale
behind this symmetry was that “they’re humans, too, and they care about the same things
we do.” Omitted from the deny navigation values were positioning, timing, and
timeliness, with a large premium placed on denying an adversary the reliability of his
navigation. The abstractness of thinking like the adversary made it difficult for the SMEs
to specify details such as value-eliminating thresholds, and there were none identified.
The capability to disable a threat to friendly aircraft was identified as threat
destruction, and categorical measures were the best fit. The bomber and fighter pilots’
points of view on scaling the threat diverged, but consensus was reached. The threats to
friendly aircraft, in increasing order, were listed as Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), tactical
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), strategic SAMs, and airborne aircraft.
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Communication
Communication — Pre-flight — Voice — Span: Area of Coverage
Measure: The area of coverage of a space-enabled voice communication system during
pre-flight planning.
Scale: categorical
Units: Categories of coverage
Direction: decreasing
SDVF: discrete

1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
AOR

Unified
Command

Hemisphere

Global

Span of Coverage

Communication — Pre-flight — Voice — Span: Bandwidth (proxy for information
volume)
Measure: The bandwidth of a space-enabled voice communication system during preflight planning.
Scale: 0 to 6
Units: factor of improvement over current capability
Direction: increasing
SDVF: exponential, ρ = 4.062

1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Factor of Improvement
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Communication — Pre-flight — Voice — Reliability
Measure: The % of pre-flight planning time space-enabled voice communication is
available.
Scale: 75% to 100%
Units: %
Direction: increasing
SDVF: exponential, ρ = 30.4
1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
75.0

77.5

80.0

82.5

85.0

87.5

90.0

92.5

95.0

97.5 100.0

Uptime (%)

Communication — In-flight — Voice — Span: Area of Coverage
Measure: The area of coverage of a space-enabled voice communication system during
in-flight execution.
Scale: categorical
Units: Categories of coverage
Direction: decreasing
SDVF: discrete

1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
AOR

Unif ied

Hemispher e

Global

Command

Span of Coverage
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Communication — In-flight — Voice — Span: Bandwidth (proxy for information
volume)
Measure: The bandwidth of a space-enabled voice communication system during in-flight
execution, as expressed by improvement over current capability.
Scale: 0 to 6
Units: factor of improvement over current capability
Direction: increasing
SDVF: linear, slope = 1/6

1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Factor of Improvement

Communication — In-flight — Voice — Reliability
Measure: The % of in-flight execution time space-enabled voice communication is
available.
Scale: 90 to 100
Units: %
Direction: increasing
SDVF: exponential, ρ = -5.55
1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

Uptime (%)

118

100

Communication — Pre-flight — Data — Span: Area of Coverage (local weight 0.4)
Measure: The area of coverage of a space-enabled data communication system during
pre-flight planning.
Scale: categorical
Units: Categories of coverage
Direction: increasing
SDVF: discrete

1.0000

Value

0.9500
0.9000
0.8500
0.8000
0.7500
AOR

Unified
Command

Hemisphere

Global

Span of Coverage

Communication — Pre-flight — Data — Span: Bandwidth (proxy for information
volume, local weight 0.6)
Measure: The bandwidth of a space-enabled data communication system during pre-flight
planning, as expressed by improvement over current capability.
Scale: 0 to 1000, logarithmic Units: factor of current capability
Direction: increasing
SDVF: exponential, ρ = 144
1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
0

10

100

1000

Factor of Improvement
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Communication — Pre-flight — Data — Reliability
Measure: The % of pre-flight planning time space-enabled data communication is
available.
Scale: 75% to 100%
Units: %
Direction: increasing
SDVF: linear, slope = 1/25
1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
75.0

87.5

100.0

Uptime (%)

Communication — In-flight — Data — Span: Area of Coverage (local weight 0.4)
Measure: The area of coverage of a space-enabled data communication system during inflight execution.
Scale: Binary
Units: Categories of coverage
Direction: increasing
SDVF: binary discrete
1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
None

AOR or greater

Span of Coverage
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Communication — In-flight — Data — Span: Bandwidth (proxy for information
volume, local weight 0.6)
Measure: The bandwidth of a space-enabled data communication system during pre-flight
planning, as expressed by improvement over current capability.
Scale: 0 to 1000, logarithmic Units: factor of current capability
Direction: increasing
SDVF: exponential, ρ = 144
1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
0

10

100

1000

Factor of Improvement

Communication — In-flight — Data — Reliability
Measure: The % of in-flight execution time space-enabled data communication is
available.
Scale: 90% to 100%
Units: %
Direction: increasing
SDVF: linear, slope = 10
1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
90.0

95.0

100.0

Uptime (%)
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Navigation
Navigation — Pre-flight — Positioning: Horizontal Error (local weight 0.4)
Measure: The error from true horizontal position of the space-based navigation signal in
the Pre-flight planning phase of an air operation.
Scale: 0 to 100
Units: ft
Direction: decreasing
SDVF: exponential, ρ = -41
1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Horizontal Error (ft)

Navigation — Pre-flight — Positioning: Altitude Error (local weight 0.6)
Measure: The error from true altitude position of the space-based navigation signal in the
Pre-flight planning phase of an air operation.
Scale: 0 to 250
Units: ft
Direction: decreasing
SDVF: exponential, ρ = 76.25

1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
0

50

100

150

200

250

Altitude Error (ft)
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Navigation — Pre-flight — Timing:
Measure: The error from true time of the space-based navigation signal in the Pre-Flight
planning phase of an air operation.
Scale: 0 to 0.1
Units: sec
Direction: decreasing
SDVF: ρ = -0.0144
1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10

Timing Error (sec)

Navigation — Pre-flight — Reliability: Uptime
Measure: The percentage of time that navigation data is available in the pre-flight
planning portion of an operation.
Scale: 0% to 50%
Units: %
Direction: increasing
SDVF: linear, slope = 50
1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
0

10

20

30

40

Uptime (%)
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50

Navigation — In-flight — Positioning: Horizontal Error (local weight 0.4)
Measure: The error from true horizontal position of the space-based navigation signal in
the In-Flight phase of an air operation.
Scale: 0 to 100
Units: ft
Direction: decreasing
SDVF: Piecewise Linear
1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
0

20

40

60

80

100

Horizontal Error (ft)

Navigation — In-flight — Positioning: Altitude Error (local weight 0.6)
Measure: The error from true altitude position of the space-based navigation signal in the
In-Flight phase of an air operation.
Scale: 0 to 250
Units: ft
Direction: decreasing
SDVF: exponential, ρ = 76.25
1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
0

50

100

150

200

Altitude Error (ft)
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250

Navigation — In-flight — Timing:
Measure: The error from true time of the space-based navigation signal in the In-Flight
phase of an air operation.
Scale: 0 to 0.1
Units: sec
Direction: decreasing
SDVF: v( x) = 1 − 10 x
1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
0.00

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.10

Timing Error (sec)

Navigation — In-flight — Reliability
Measure: The percentage of time that navigation data is available in the In-flight phase of
an operation.
Scale: 90% to 100%
Units: %
Direction: increasing
SDVF: exponential, ρ = 3.05
1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
90.0

92.0

94.0

96.0

98.0

100.0

Uptime (%)
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Navigation — In-flight — Timeliness
Measure: The delay between request for navigation system update and receipt in the Inflight phase of an operation.
Scale: 0 to 60
Units: sec
Direction: decreasing
SDVF: exponential, ρ = -6.9

1.0000
0.9000
0.8000

Value

0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
0

12

24

36

48

60

Update Time (sec)
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Denial
Denial — Information Denial — Communication
This value is structured identically to Communication in the first tier, except that the
value is placed on a space-based capability to deny an adversary the Communication
that was valued in the first tier. The same measures and SDVFs apply, but no value
preservation thresholds were identified.
Denial — Information Denial — Navigation
This value is divided into pre-flight and in-flight components in the same manner as
Navigation in the first tier. The SMEs identified Reliability as the center of gravity for
both the pre-flight and in-flight components, and did not consider an adversary’s
Navigation Positioning, Navigation Timing, or Navigation Timeliness worthy of
denial.

Value

Denial — Threat Removal
Measure: The capability to disable a threat to friendly aircraft.
Scale: categorical
Units: Categories of threat
Direction: increasing
SDVF: discrete

1.0000
0.9000
0.8000
0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.2000
0.1000
0.0000
AAA

Tactical SAM

Strategic SAM

Threat Level
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Airborne
Aircraft
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